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HONORING CHOICE BY CONSENTING ADULTS:
PROSPECTIVE CONFLICT WAIVERS AS
A MATURE SOLUTION TO ETHICAL
GAMESMANSHIP--A RESPONSE TO MR. FOX
JonathanJ. Lerneri

I.

INTRODUCTION

In a recent article entitled All's OK Between Consenting Adults:
Enlightened Rule on Privacy, Obscene Rule on Ethics,' published in

Volume 29 of this Lav Review (the "Article"), author Lawrence J. Fox
assails the increasing utilization of prospective conflict waivers by law
firms with even the most sophisticated corporate clients.2 The central
thesis of the Article is that a prospective conflicts waiver agreement
between a law firm and a highly sophisticated client, even one advised
on the implications of the waiver by independent counsel, at the
inception of the attorney-client relationship when both are able to make
* The Author is a member of the law firm of Skadden, Arps. Slate, Meagher & Horn LLP
and is currently the Chair of the Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the Asseiation
of the Bar of the City of New York, and is a former member of the Departmental Disciplinary
Committee for the First Judicial Department. Appellate Division. He is currently an Adjunct
Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, where he teaches Legal Ethics, and was formerly a
member of the faculty at Columbia University School of Law, %hera he taught Professional
Responsibility. The views expressed herein are those of the Author and do not reflect those of any
other member of his law firm or any other organization. The assistance of Russell M. Yalkwitt and
Scott Greenberg is gratefully acknowledged.
1. Lawrence J. Fox, All's OK Between Consenting Adults: Enlightened Rule on Privacy;
Obscene Rule on Ethics, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 701 (2001).
2. See generally id.
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a mutually agreeable and rational determination concerning the types of
future conflicts that will prevent the law firm from accepting an

engagement adverse to the client, is a blight on the legal profession.'
Given this premise, it is hardly surprising that Mr. Fox also condemns
recent initiatives by the American Bar Association ("ABA") to
modernize the guidelines to facilitate the use of prospective conflict
waivers as a scourge that should be halted forthwith.
In proclaiming that the sky is about to fall, at least on the legal
profession, Mr. Fox advocates the prohibition of prospective conflict

waivers with a fervor that was once reserved for pool halls in River City
or "Demon Rum." Although cloaked in high-minded language, this

prohibitionist position, which is an antiquated and myopic one, would
ride roughshod over one of the most sacrosanct client rights-the right
to select counsel of choice.' In his zeal to encourage clients who

would-absent an effective conflicts waiver-invoke the most tenuous

"conflicts" by lawyers with whom they may have little, if any, real

relationship, under the rubric of undivided loyalty, Mr. Fox overlooks
the important rights of the client on the receiving end of the tactical use
of conflicts, who is likely to be deprived of counsel of choice-usually
counsel with whom this client has a long-standing relationship.6 Viewed
in this context, the possibility that a client may succeed in welching on
3. See id. at 715-28.
4. See id. at 708-15.
5. The right of clients to retain the counsel of their choice is so fundamental that the Ncw
York Court of Appeals has decisively established that it is "absolute"; even where two adverse
clients select the same lawyer to represent them both to prepare a separation agreement. For
example, in Levine v. Levine, 436 N.E.2d 476 (N.Y. 1982), the court stated:
While the potential conflict of interests inherent in such joint representation suggests that
the husband and wife should retain separate counsel, the parties have an absolute right to
be represented by the same attorney provided "there has been full disclosure between the
parties, not only of all relevant facts but also of their contextual significance, and there
has been an absence of inequitable conduct or other infirmity which might vitiate the
execution of the agreement."
Id. at 479 (quoting Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855 (N.Y. 1977)); see also Cerqueira v.
Clivilles, 623 N.Y.S.2d 580, 580 (App. Div. 1995) ("A civil litigant has a fundamental right to the
legal counsel of choice and we are not unmindful that disqualification motions ... are frequently
used as a litigation tactic."); Glashow v. Linden Towers Coop. #4, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2001, at 25
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 30, 2001) ("Disqualification of counsel, however, conflicts with the general
policy favoring a party's right to representation by counsel of choice, and it deprives current clients
of an attorney familiar with the particular matter."), available at http://www6.law.con/ny/com (last
visited Oct. 10, 2001).
6. Of course, this is a zero-sum game and every client who successfully raises a "conflict"
deprives another client of their lawyer or counsel of choice. The "payoff" to the objecting client
engaged in this ethical gamesmanship is enhanced where the lawyer-client relationship that is
disrupted is a significant and long-standing one that will exacerbate the harm to the other client to
whom the objecting client is opposed.
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an agreement not to interfere with another client's long-standing
relationship with counsel whenever it becomes expedient to do so,
should not be a cause for great comfort for Mr. Fox as it can only fortify
the negative public perception that lawyers are ethically challenged.
To be sure, prospective conflict waivers may not be suited to every
client and there are clients that would not be expected, absent
independent representation, to comprehend or appreciate the potential
consequences of an advance consent. At the other end of the spectrum,
however, it is extremely hard to argue that highly sophisticated corporate
and individual clients, who are well advised by inside or outside
counsel-often both-are incapable of understanding the implications of
waiving future conflicts. After all, these clients regularly allocate risks in
agreements with full appreciation of the implications. Indeed, every time
a client executes a general release, unknown potential risks and
ramifications are accepted. They do not vitiate the legal effect of these
agreements any more than they should abrogate prospective conflict
waivers.
A. The Contextfor Evaluating Prospective Conflict Waivers:
The Overly Rigid Application-UndividedLoyalty
Just how extreme this prohibitionist position and its deleterious
consequences for client loyalty really are can only be fully appreciated
in the context of the overly-broad swath that the duty of undivided
loyalty already cuts into the right of clients to select their counsel of
choice. This is the problem that a prospective conflicts waiver is
designed to manage. Since the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
decided Cinemza 5, Ltd. v. Cineramna, Inc.7 more than twenty-five years
ago, it has become axiomatic that a law firm's representation of a client
in a matter adverse to another current client of the firm is almost always
improper, even though the two matters are entirely unrelated 8 In the
ensuing quarter century, the practice of law has evolved dramatically.
Clients that once utilized the legal services of a single law firm for all
their needs, especially large multinational corporations, now frequently
engage numerous firms to handle discrete and highly specialized legal
problems, 9 and the size of law firms has increased exponentially t0
7. 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
8. See iU at 1386-87 (holding that two matters need not have a "substantial relationship" in
order for Canon 5 to apply).
9. See generally Ted Schneyer, Nostalgia in the Fifth Circuit:Holding the Line on Litigation
Conflicts Through FederalConunon Law, 16 REv. LmT. 537,542-43 & n.1S (1997).
10. See generallyid.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:971

In this context, the application of a broad inflexible rule prohibiting
all concurrent adverse representation, which is premised on the duty of
undivided loyalty to one current client embodied in Canon 5 of the New
York Code of Professional Responsibility ("Canon 5") and Rule 1.7 of
the ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct ("Model Rule 1.7"), may
unnecessarily prevent other clients from exercising their important right
to select counsel of choice and can also deprive the other clients of the
law firm's loyalty-the very attribute the rule is supposed to protect. As
applied, this extremely rigid prohibition on all adverse concurrent
representation can preclude a client that has relied on a law firm for
many years from continuing to utilize its services if the law firm
happens to represent the client's adversary in another matter," even
though the other engagement is entirely unrelated to the controversy and
there is no conceivable risk that any diminution of loyalty to, or
zealousness in representing, the other client would occur." As a result,
Canon 5 and Model Rule 1.7 have become a tactical weapon of choice to
attempt to disqualify the adversary's lawyer,'3 especially by clients
11. Some courts treat all members of a corporate family as a single "client" for conflicts
purposes, see Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 223, 227 (S.D.N.Y.), affTd, 653 F.2d 746 (2d Cir.
1981), thereby extending the prohibition on adverse representation to subsidiaries and affiliates. In a
formal opinion, the American Bar Association has, however, concluded that, absent a contrary
understanding with the client, corporate entities should be treated as distinct entities for conflicts
purposes and it is not unethical to simultaneously represent a client in a matter adverse to a
subsidiary or affiliate while concurrently representing the parent. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 390 (1995).
12. See Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 1244, 1298-1301 (1981).
13. For example, in Sports Medicine Service of Gramercy Park v. Perez, 657 N.Y.S.2d 314
(Civ. Ct. 1997), the court stated:
Disqualification motions have become a cottage industry. All too frequently
attorneys bring such motions as a litigation tactic. Even where the situation presented
seems to implicate a disciplinary rule if read literally, the court must be wary to prevent
its misuse, particularly when it is unnecessarily detrimental to the adverse party's rights.
Disqualification should not be ordered lightly, particularly where the disqualification
would not advance the very purposes that the disciplinary rule seeks to promote. DR
5-105(C) is intended to protect clients from an attorney who is incapable of zealously
representing the potentially competing interests of each client. Mechanical, uncritical
application of the disciplinary rule in this case would not only result in injustice, but
would not protect the defendants, who are members of the class that the Rule is intended
to protect. Disqualification here would be purposeless and contrary to public policy.
Id. at 315-16 (citations omitted). In Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc),
vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recognized the "proliferation of disqualification motions and the use of such motions for purely
tactical reasons." Id. at 437. While the court was unable to determine the precise increase in such
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whose relationship with a law firm it is seeking to disqualify is
extremely limited, but which still qualifies for protection under
Canon 514

B. The Problem
An increasingly common fact pattern illustrates the problem:
For many years, a corporation has relied on one outside law firm to
provide antitrust advice, including creating and monitoring of its
antitrust compliance program and representing it in litigation. Although
the legal representation has been costly, the corporation has benefited
from the development of a well-trained group of lawyers who are
intimately familiar with the corporation's business. Equally important, a
relationship of mutual trust and confidence has developed over the years
between senior management of the corporation and the law firm.
Under these circumstances, it is only natural that when the
corporation finds itself named as a defendant in an antitrust suit brought
by a potential entrant alleging monopolization and seeking an
astronomical judgment, the general counsel turns to the corporation's
long-time counsel, whose senior antitrust partner is asked to rush over to
review the pleading and to counsel, as well as console, the general
counsel and the chief executive officer on this bet-your-company case.
Upon reading the caption of the complaint at the meeting, the lawyer
gasps, turns to the two corporate officers and says: "I do not know how
to tell you this, but the plaintiff has recently become a small client of our
California office, which is negotiating a small lease for a division of the
plaintiff. We had no idea this company was going to become a
competitor of yours or we would never have taken them on."
The Chief Executive Officer responds: "Come on, Joe, we know
you and your firm and we are confident that you will fight tooth and nail
for us. We are not worried about who is doing what in a small real estate
matter in your California office. We do not believe for a moment that
you would ever 'roll over' after what we have been through together.
We trust you totally. So, do not worry, we are not concerned; let us
focus on the merits." The lawyer, seeing her major client slip through
motions, it believed the use of disqualification motions had substantially increased. See id.; see also

infra note 38 and cases discussed therein.
14. Even a dormant relationship has been held to be sufficient to preclude simultaneous
adverse representation, see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-wright Corp.. No. 78 Civ. 1295. slip.
op. at 5 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1978), as has a relationship that ended more than a sear bzfore if
there is any possibility that additional issues may arise. See Manoir-Elcetroallo) s Corp. v. Aimalloy
Corp., 711 F. Supp. 188, 192-96 (D.NJ. 1989).
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her fingers, reluctantly responds: "I am afraid you do not understand
how the lawyers' conflicts rules work in situations like this. Because the
plaintiff currently is a client of our law firm, we cannot oppose it in any
matter, especially in litigation. So we cannot take the case without the
plaintiff's consent. I cannot even discuss the merits with you because it
would be considered disloyal."
The chief executive explodes: "But that is crazy-I cannot believe
what I am hearing. The plaintiff is not affected at all. The lease
transaction is between the plaintiff and a landlord 3,000 miles away and
plaintiff's representation by your firm could not possibly be harmed by
your defense of our company in this case. It does not help my company
for your firm to be less than enthusiastic in the negotiations in
California. We have been paying your firm an annual retainer for years
to have you available for a critical situation like this-what about loyalty
to us? What kind of so-called ethics rule would require you to be
disloyal to my company?"
The answer to this rhetorical question is: an inflexible ethical
regime that deprives a client from continuing to utilize the services of
counsel-no matter how long the relationship-because an adversary of
the client happens also to be utilizing its same law firm in a matter that
has no relationship whatsoever to the matter in dispute and which could
not be expected to be affected in any manner, much less adversely, by
the lawyer's other representation. Of course, the draconian impact on the
lawyer's loyalty to the long-standing client in the foregoing scenario,
stemming from the rigid application of Canon 5, could have been
prevented if the law firm had obtained a prospective conflicts waiver.
Not surprisingly, the same vocal group of prohibitionists that bemoans
the use of prospective conflict waivers as a vehicle to manage this
unnecessary intrusion on client choice, is equally vehement in its
insistence on maintaining the underlying rigid rules."
We examine in Part 11 the origin and adverse impact on client rights
of the broad, inflexible rule precluding all engagements adverse to a
current client and review some of the efforts to ameliorate its harsh
effects. In Part III, we discuss conflict waivers and review the ABA's
15. Even Mr. Fox is forced to acknowledge the regrettable impact that comes from depriving
a client of a long-standing attorney-client relationship. See Fox, supra note 1, at 719. In the Article,
he notes that a client with a long-standing relationship might not be able to switch lawyers because
[tihe client may be engaged in a short deadline transaction .... [Mlay have invested
thousands, tens of thousands of dollars, in getting the law firm up to speed and may not
want to switch law firms .... [And,] [tihe lawyer and the client may have developed a
rapport, even a sense of trust.
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proposed rule (the "Proposed Rule") that would apply to prospective
conflict waivers and facilitate the use of advance waivers as a method to
managing the problems of the overly rigid rule. In Part IV, we address
Mr. Fox's criticism of this proposal.
II. THE GENESIS OFTH-E BROAD RuLE PROHIBITING
ALL ENGAGEMENT ADVERSE TO CURRENT
CLIENT CONFLICTS
A.

Cinema 5 and the Origin of the PrimaFacie Rule Against
Simultaneous Adverse Representation

The source of the problem can be traced to the Second Circuit's
decision in Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc."' In Cinema 5, the Second
Circuit concluded that the "substantial relationship" test, while
appropriate "where the representation of a former client has been
terminated," does not apply where the relationship is a continuing one."
In the concurrent client situation, "[wihere the relationship is a
continuing one, adverse representation is prima facie improper."'" The
court expressly left open, however, the possibility that this presumption
of diminished vigor could be overcome. "[Tihe attorney must be
prepared to show, at the very least, that there will be no actual or
apparent conflict in loyalties or diminution in the vigor of his
representation."' 9
B. SubsequentApplication of Cinema 5
The Second Circuit's invitation to analyze the impact of the
conflicting representation on the affected client has been ignored by
subsequent cases in favor of a mechanical test that both begins and ends
with a determination that there is simultaneous representation by the law
firm and that the requisite adversity exists. As a result, the prima facie
rule adopted in Cinema 5 has become a per se rule.
The Third Circuit's decision in IBM Corp. v Levin-' ("Levin")
exemplifies the inflexible application of the rule. Levin involved an

16. 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
17. Id. at 1387.
18. Id. Although the court's rejection of the substantial relationship test has been embraced by
the vast majority of subsequent cases and ethics rules, the visdom of this conclusion is certainly
subject to debate.
19. Id.
20. 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978).
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antitrust action by Howard S. Levin, and the Levin Computer Corp.

("Levin"), an upstart computer company, against IBM that had
proceeded for six years. 2' While the case was pending, Levin's law firm,
Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey ("CBM"), accepted engagements for

IBM in labor matters that were entirely unrelated to the antitrust action.22
Claiming that it "discovered" the conflict six years into the case," rather

than curing the dual representation by simply terminating the firm as its
labor counsel, IBM attempted to exploit the situation to its advantage. It

sought to cripple Levin's antitrust case by stripping Levin of its lawyers
by moving to disqualify CBM based on the unrelated simultaneous

representation in the labor matter.24
Although Levin's counsel argued that no adverse effect on IBM
could or would result from these two completely unrelated

representations, the District Court granted IBM's disqualification
motion, and the Third Circuit affirmed, applying the prima facie rule

from Cinema 5 as a per se rule of disqualification.' In doing so, the
court ignored the Cinema 5 rebuttable presumption that the presumed

impropriety could be overcome through proof "that there will be no
actual or apparent conflict in loyalties or diminution in the vigor of his
representation.

26

The Third Circuit ruled that the conduct must be

measured against the duty of undivided loyalty that an attorney owes to
each of his clients, not the similarities in litigation. 7
Not surprisingly, the court offered no explanation of how Levin's
interest could be furthered by the rendering of bad labor advice by CBM
21. See id. at 274-75.
22. See id. at 276.
23. See id. at 277.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 279-80.
26. Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976).
27. See Levin, 579 F.2d at 280 (citing Cinema 5, 528 F.2d at 1386). The court also relied on
Canon 9, the need to avoid the "appearance of impropriety," for the "maintenance of public
confidence in the propriety of the conduct of those associated with the administration of justice," id.
at 283, a ground which generally has been abandoned as a basis for disqualification, See, e.g..
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433,445 (2d Cir. 1980) (en bane) ("[Tihe possible 'appearance of
impropriety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order... particularly...
where.., the appearance of impropriety is not very clear."') (alterations in original) (quoting Bd. of
Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979)), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106
(1981); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (Weinstein, J.) ("[The appearance of impropriety is usually insufficient, in and of itself, to
support disqualification."); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Marco Int'l Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d 108,
113 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that the interests of fairness and efficiency outweigh the minimal risk
of appearance of impropriety); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp,
534, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that in the Second Circuit, "courts are reluctant to rest
disqualification of counsel solely upon Canon 9").
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to IBM or how the law firm's representation of Levin in its antitrust case

against IBM could lead to any "diminution in the vigor" of its unrelated
labor representation of IBM.2t Indeed, the failure of IBM's general

counsel to "discover" the simultaneous labor representation until some
six years into the antitrust action leads to the ineluctable conclusion that

IBM believed that CBM's labor advice had been perfectly satisfactory.
And if IBM was genuinely concerned, it could have, and should have,
terminated the law firm's representation and told it to permanently cross

IBM off its client list.!
But the objective in this case, like most other disqualification

motions, had little, if any, basis in high-minded concerns over loyalty
and everything to do with litigation strategy. Even a cursory analysis of
the Levin facts, which typify disqualification motions rooted in Cinema

5, shows that Levin-not IBM-had a right to be concerned about
loyalty.3' In Levin, a small client faced the prospect that the loyalty of its
28. The client in the non-adverse matter, here IBM, faces few risks, if any, especially
compared with the client in the adverse matter, here Levin. In Levin. the law firm represented IBM
in a matter that did not implicate or involve Levin's interests. See Lei-in, 579 F.2d at 280. As a
result, the incentive for the law firm to breach its duty to the client in the non-adver- nrtter is
almost nonexistent. See Developments in the Lair, supra note 12. at 1299-1300. Despite this
analysis, the inflexible Cinema 5 rle, as applied in cases like Levin, proscribes dual representation
at the behest of the unaffected client. Because the other client's interets-Levin's-were not
implicated in the non-adverse matter, Levin had no reason to encourage CBM to betray IBM in the
non-adverse matter. This factor reduced the danger that CBM %,illbe exposed to and succumb to
pressure to act disloyally. CBM had no incentive or reason to "soft pedal" or "pull its punches" in
representing IBM because CBM was not antagonizing Levin in any way by king as zealous as
possible for IBM in its labor negotiations. Levin was interested exclusively in the adverse matter, in
which CBM did not represent IBM. Thus, in the non-adverse matter, the law firm has little incentive
to commit acts of "spontaneous" disloyalty.
29. See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation:The JudicialRole, 65 FoRalw., L
REV. 71, 113-14 (1996). Professor Green suggests allowing the federal courts to develop
disqualification standards through a case-by-case balancing process that takes full account of the
costs disqualification imposes on the courts and on innocent clients, but treats disqualification solely
as a remedy to redress or avert breaches of confidentiality or other tangible harm, not as a pure
sanction to enforce ethics compliance. See id. at 73-74. Applying this approach, Professor Green
sharply criticizes the Third Circuit's decision in Levin because, inter alia, the disqualification
motion came five years into the litigation and IBM made no showing that it had been harmed or was
likely to be harmed by the offending representation. See id. at 84-85.
30. Because the law firm's representation of Levin was in the matter where Levin's interests
were adverse to IBM's interests, CBM's simultaneous representation of IBM in the non-advares
matter may create a substantial danger of dilution of its loyalty to Levin in the adverse matter. See
Developments in the Lair,supra note 12, at 1293. CBM's representation of IBM in the non-advcer
matter creates two basic risks for Levin in the adverse matter. One risk is the danger that IBM may
be perceived as a potentially important client to CBM and will be able to take advantage of this
favored status to procure CBM's betrayal of Levin in the adverse matter. The second ri'k is that the
law firm, on its own initiative, may represent Levin less vigorously to avoid antagonizing IBM.
whom CBM represents in the non-adverse matter. Given the real danger that the law firm's divided
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lawyer was being "purchased" by a huge conglomerate's legal business.
But Levin had no problem with its law firm's zeal-it was no doubt this
very zeal which prompted IBM to attempt to remove CBM. In the name
of client loyalty, the mechanical application of Cinema 5 ironically
deprived Levin of the loyalty of its counsel when it was needed the

most.
A similar result was reached in FosterWheeler Corp. v. Edelman."'
In that case, Foster Wheeler's long-time takeover counsel, Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz ("Wachtell"), was disqualified in an action arising
2
from a contested takeover of Foster Wheeler by Asher Edelman.
Wachtell was disqualified because one of the defendants in the Foster
Wheeler action, Howard Alper, was a partner of Edelman, and also a

partner in an entity called J&J Investors, which was a member of a group
of more than eighty limited partners represented by Wachtell in a
completely unrelated bankruptcy matter.33 The court rejected Wachtell's

argument that no conceivable impact on Alper, a partner in an entity that
was a "tag along" client in a large and unrelated class action, resulted
from Wachtell's representation of Foster Wheeler. 4 The court applied
the per se rule of disqualification mechanically without analyzing the
impact of the alleged conflict.3" The court did not explain how Edelman
could be prejudiced in the unrelated bankruptcy matter by Wachtell's
representation of Foster Wheeler in the contested takeover. Of course,
Wachtell's disqualification vindicated no real ethical objective, but it did
serve a very real strategic goal of stripping an adversary of counsel in
the midst of a fast-moving takeover battle.6
loyalties may prevent its faithful representation of Levin, the client represented in the adverse
matter, the Cinema 5 proscription of simultaneous representation would be sensible here without the
consent of Levin. Ironically, in Levin, Levin faced these potential theoretical dangers of divided
loyalty, but it chose to continue with its counsel of choice, because its counsel was doing a zealous
and, no doubt, effective job. IBM did not face any of the dangers that Levin did, but sought to
disqualify the law firm because it was doing a zealous and effective job for Levin.
31. No. Civ. 87-4346, slip op. at 2 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 1988).
32. See id. at 2,4.
33. See id. at 3.
34. See id. at 3-4.
35. See id.
36. In sharp contrast to the mechanical approach applied in cases like Levin and Foster
Wheeler, the district judge in Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. C82-812C,
Transcript of Hearing (W.D. Wash. July 9, 1982), refused to order the disqualification of counsel
based on an alleged violation of Canon 5 in a takeover. There, a law firm was representing the target
of an unsolicited tender offer in litigation against a bidder. Unbeknownst to the law firm, it had been
simultaneously representing a subsidiary of the bidder in a dormant litigation that remained pending
in the Delaware Chancery Court, which was not revealed in a conflicts check because it had been
recently acquired by the bidder. The bidder moved to disqualify the law firm based on the conflict
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C. The Ethical Costs ofAn Overly BroadApplication of Canon 5Undue hfluence on Client Choice of Counseland
Mandated Disloyalty
The sweeping preclusion on all adverse concurrent representation
frequently is justified by those who, like Mr. Fox, espouse the

importance of demanding a lawyer's undivided loyalty to all clients no
matter how narrow the relationship. But this rationale overlooks the
steep ethical price that must be paid by the other client. An overly broad

application of Canon 5, which goes beyond what is necessary to protect
the client in the non-adverse relationship, needlessly deprives other

clients of the extremely important right to select their counsel of
choice,7 can mandate disloyalty to a law firm's client-the very value

and the law firm sought to cure the conflict by withdrawing from the Delaware litigation. %hich it
did with permission of the Chancery Court. The district court refused to disqualify the law firm
from representing the target in the fast-moving takeover litigation because, interalia, the prejudice
to the target outweighed other considerations. The court stated that "discovery in preparation for the
[preliminary injunction] motion is proceeding at a feverish pace. To require Ohem-Nuclear to
change counsel at this juncture would do them a grave disservice .... 'The motion for
disqualification is therefore denied." If,
at 32.
37. Justice Brennan recognized the importance of this right in Richardson-Merrell Inc. %.
Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring). "A fundamental premise of the adversary
system is that individuals have the right to retain the attorney of their choice to represent their
interests in judicial proceedings." Id at 441. The Second Circuit has a general aversion to attorney
disqualification. "'This reluctance [to disqualify] probably derives from the fact that disqualification
has an immediate adverse effect on the client by separating him from counsel of his choice, and that
disqualification motions are often interposed for tactical reasons."' Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
NJ. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 338, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (Wieinstein, J.)
(alteration in
original) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated on other
grounds,449 U.S. 1106 (1981)); see, e.g., Evans v. Artek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788,791-9212d Cir.
1983); Sumitomo Corp. v. J.P. Morgan & Co., Nos. 99 Civ. 8780,4004 (JSM). 2000 WL 145747, at
*3(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000); Rosewood Apts. Corp. v. Perpignano. No. 99 Civ. 4226 (NRBI IMHD,
2000 WL 145982, at *3(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7,2000); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.Manshul Constr. Corp.,
No. 95 Civ. 3994 O.ALM), 1997 WL 214946, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 19971. The Sixth
Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VL It is well-settled that a component of this right is the pro!ction
of a defendant's opportunity to obtain the counsel of choice. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
53 (1932). Although no constitutional counterpart exists for civil cases, the ethics rules. reflecting
strong public policy, specifically recognize the importance of a client's right to select counsel of
choice by prohibiting certain restrictions on an attorney's right to practice. See N.Y. CODE OF
PROF'L REsPONsmnmrry DR 2-108(B) (1999); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CODUCr R. 5.6 419901.
"The type of restriction that violates DR 2-108(B) is one that completely prohibits the lawyer from
representing clients and thus offends 'the right of members of the public to select and rqpos
confidence in lawyers of their choice without r"triction by providing full availability of legal
counsel.'" Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 416 n.2 (N.Y. 19891 fHanezc. J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 534 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (App.
Div. 1988). Model Rule 5.6(b) bars settlement agreements restricting the right of the plaintiff's
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supposedly advanced by Canon 5-inflicts needless prejudice on

blameless clients, does not serve the purpose of the conflict rules, and
invites the kind of gamesmanship that the courts have condemned.38

Preventing a client from engaging counsel of choice where there is,
and can be, no adverse impact on the lawyer's loyalty to the other client
in the unrelated matter is antithetical to the client's right to counsel of
choice. And, where the client wishes to engage counsel with whom the

client already has had a long-standing relationship, an unnecessarily
broad application of Cinema 5 actually mandates disloyalty to a client of
the firm. While the "prima facie" rule originally described by Cinema 5
may have enabled the courts or ethics committees to strike an

appropriate balance, this mechanical application completely ignores
these competing concerns.
D. Legislative Solution-The Texas Example

The cleanest solution to this problem would be to simply change
the rule. To be sure, neither the ABA nor most academics have shown
much inclination to do so." However, at least one state has done so.

Texas adopted the "substantial relationship" test to measure conflicts of
lawyer to represent future claimants in actions against the defendant. See ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof 1Responsibility, Formal Op. 371 (1993).
38. See, e.g., Kassis v. Teacher's Ins. & Annuity Assoc., 678 N.Y.S.2d 32, 34 (App. Div.
1998) (noting that "'[m]otions to disqualify are frequently used as an offensive tactic' and "'may
be used frivolously as a litigation tactic' (quoting Solow v. W.R. Grace & Co., 632 N.E.2d 437,
440 (N.Y. 1994) (alterations in original))), rev'd, 717 N.E.2d 674 (1999); Bongiasca v. Bongiasca,
679 N.Y.S.2d 132, 133 (App. Div. 1998) (accepting the lower court's finding that "given the longterm participation of both parties' attorneys in the parties' affairs... that defendant made the
disqualification motion as a delaying tactic"); McDade v. McDade, 659 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 (App.
Div. 1997) (rejecting disqualification motion when "plaintiff was aware of the facts which formed
the basis for the claim of conflict of interest" two and a half years before seeking disqualification
and thus it appeared "that the motion was 'little more than a tactic clearly designed to stall and
prolong a divorce action"'); Drury v. Tucker, 621 N.Y.S.2d 822, 823 (App. Div. 1994) (noting that
"disqualification motion[s] must be 'carefully scrutinized' because it 'denies a party's right to
representation by the attorney of [his] choice' and denying the disqualification motion because it
was "made to gain a 'strategic advantage' over plaintiff' (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. P'ship v. 777 S.H. Corp., 508 N.E.2d 647, 650 (N.Y. 1987)));
Glashow v. Linden Towers Coop. # 4, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2001, at 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 30, 2001)
(noting that "a disqualification motion must be 'carefully scrutinized' because it 'denies a party's
right to representation by the attorney of [his] choice"' and denying the disqualification motion
because it was "made to gain a 'strategic advantage' over plaintiff') (alterations in original)
(citations omitted), available at http:lwww6.law.comlnylcom (last visited Oct. 10, 2001); see also
Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland, Lawtyer's Conflict of Interest-A Judge's View, N.Y. L.J., July 20,
1977, at I (stating that disqualification motions have become "common tools of the litigation
process, being used.., for purely strategic purposes" (footnote omitted)).
39. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1987).
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a current client. Rule 1.06 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
ProfessionalConduct allows concurrent representation except where the
two representations involve a "substantially related matter,' - or the

attorney's representation of one party "reasonably appears to be or
become[s] adversely limited by the lawyer's or law firm's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the lawyer's or
law firm's own interests."4'
Applying Texas Rule 1.06, a Texas intermediate appellate court in
Conoco, Inc. v. Baskin4 2 affirmed the denial of a motion to disqualify a
plaintiff's law firm, which was simultaneously representing the

defendant in unrelated matters.43 In reaching this conclusion, the court
considered the nature and status of the concurrent representation of
plaintiff and defendant in the unrelated matters and found there was no

evidence of any exposure by the law firm to any confidences in the other
litigation that would enhance plaintiff's posture in its suit against

defendant, or undermine defendant's position in the same suit." It seems
extremely unlikely, however, that New York or many other states will
follow Texas' lead anytime soon.41
40. TEX. DIscIPLINARY RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.06(bt 1) (1990).
41. Id. Within the meaning of the Texas Disciplinary Rule, matters of different clients are
"substantially related" when "a genuine threat exists that a lawyer may divulge in one matter
confidential information obtained in the other because the facts and issues involved in bath are so
similar." Id, case note 4. In addition, the representation of one client is
"directly adverse" to the representation of another client if the lawcer's independent
judgment on behalf of a client or the lawyer's ability or willingness to cosider,
recommend or carry out a course of action will be or is reasonably likely to be adver ly
affected by the lawyer's representation of, or responsibilities to, the other client.
Id. cmL 6. The dual representation also is directly adverse if the la,%wyer reasonably appears to bz
called upon to espouse adverse positions in the same matter or a related matter. See id.
42. 803 S.W.2d416(Tex. App. 1991).
43. See id. at 422.
44. See id. at 421-22. In In re Dresser Indus., Inc, 972 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1992), the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit limited the application of the Texas Disciplinary Rules in the federal
courts. Reversing the district court, which had applied the Texas Rules and had accordingly denied
the disqualification motion due to lack of a substantial relationship, the Fifth Circuit held:
The district court clearly erred in holding that its local rules, and thus the Texas
rules, which it adopted, are the "sole" authority governing a motion to disqualify.
Motions to disqualify are substantive motions affecting the rights of the parties and are
determined by applying standards developed under federal law.
...
[Wie consider the motion governed by the ethical rules announced by the
national profession in the light of the public interest and the litigants' rights.
Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
45. A recent decision, Sumitomo Corp. v. J.P. Morgan & Co., Nos. 99 Civ. 8790. 4004
(JSM),2000 WL 145747, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8. 2000). may provide hopo, however that a mora
analytical and flexible approach to the application of Canon 5 to current client conflicts may be- on
the horizon. See discussion infra notes 50-71 and accompanying text.
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E. The "Trial Taint" Test
The Second Circuit has sought to soften the litigation impact of the
rule and eliminate at least some of the gamesmanship through adoption
of the "trial taint" test, which is designed to preclude disqualification
unless the trial will be tainted. 6 But, a rule that eliminates

disqualification as a sanction is vastly different from giving ethical
approval to the underlying conduct and does not obviate the ethical
breach in representing one current client against another. This was a
conclusion recently reinforced in Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 47 where the court declined to disqualify counsel based on the
absence of "trial taint," although the judge determined the firm's
simultaneous representation to be violative of Canon 5.48 Whenever the
law firm chosen by a client has a current client relationship with the

putative client's adversary, no matter how attenuated it is to the matter in
controversy, acceptance of the proposed engagement still would be
46. See, e.g., Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746, 748-49 (2d Cir. 1981). In Glueck,
the Second Circuit declined to extend the flat prohibition of Canon 5 to certain nontraditional
clients, such as trade associations, opting for a more lenient "substantial relationship" test to assess a
lawyer's concurrent representation of a trade association and another client adverse to a member of
the trade association. See id at 749-50.
47. 98 F. Supp. 2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
48. See id. at 455-56. In Universal City Studios, Judge Lewis Kaplan denied Time Warner's
motion to disqualify defendant's counsel even though the attorneys currently represented Time
Warner in another case. See id. The court found that when the law firm agreed to represent Time
Warner and another plaintiff in an unrelated case, it "surrendered the right to represent another
client in litigation against any of them." Id. at 453. Even though the court concluded that the firm
was acting improperly in seeking to represent defendants while representing Time Warner in the
other case, the court concluded that it did not necessarily follow that the firm should be disqualified.
See id. at 455. Judge Kaplan noted that "[dlisqualification motions are subject to abuse for tactical
purposes," and that "disqualification... deprives a client of counsel of its choice," and may require
complex satellite litigation extraneous to the case before the court. Id. He emphasized that
professional disciplinary bodies, including the Grievance Committee of the district court, "are
available to police the behavior of counsel." Id. Disqualification is only appropriate, in the Second
Circuit, if a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility gives rise to significant risk of
"trial taint," see Glueck, 653 F.2d at 748, which is a significant risk that the conflict will affect the
attorney's ability to represent the client with vigor (in violation of Canons 5 and 9), or if the
attorney is in a position to use privileged information acquired by representation in another matter
(in violation of Canons 4 and 9). See Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir 1979),
vacatedon other grounds,449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
Judge Kaplan did not find a real risk of tainting the trial or any risk of prejudicing Time
Warner. The motion was tactically motivated. See Universal City Studios, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 455-56.
Disqualification at this stage would prejudice the defendants by forcing them "to find and educate
new counsel for an important trial that now is less than two months away or seek an adjournment
and thus perhaps prolong the duration of the preliminary injunction." Id. at 456. The court believed
that "Time Warner sat on its hands for too long to have substantial claims on the Court's exercise of
its discretion." Id. The court, however, found the firm did have a breach of ethics, and in other
circumstances, it could be subject to disqualification. See id. at 455.
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ethically impermissible and the law firm is unlikely to accept it. As a
result, if counsel has been retained, the "trial taint" test may spare the
client the draconian problems stemming from disqualification, but it will
do little, if anything, to assist the client in securing its law firm of choice
in the first place.
F. Sumitomo Corp. v. J.P. Morgan-An AnatlyticalApproach to
Current Client Conflicts
Absent a rule change, any departure from the inflexible approach to
correct client conflicts will have to be developed by courts and bar
associations. Former Chief Judge Kaufman said, "[w]hen dealing with
ethical principles ... we cannot paint with broad strokes ... and the
conclusion in a particular case can be reached only after painstaking
analysis of the facts and precise application of precedent"" Nowhere is
this admonition against overly broad ethics rules more apt than in
application to Canon 5.
Recently, in Sumitono Corp. v. JP. Morgan & Co.,.3 Judge Martin
adopted a thoughtful and analytical approach to the application of Canon
5. In denying a motion to disqualify Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison ("Paul Weiss"), the court examined the impact of the alleged
conflict and whether it would actually "diminish the vigor" of the law
firm. Relying on the Second Circuit's decision in Board of Education v.
Nyquist,5' Judge Martin held disqualification is appropriate under Canon
5 only where the attorney's conflict undermines a court's confidence in
the vigor of the attorney's representation of the client?: Unlike the
sweeping per se disqualification often applied to concurrent adverse
representation, the "diminished vigor" test applied by the court in
Sumitomo Corp. would limit Canon 5 to situations where its purpose is
served. To be sure, the procedural context in Sumitomo Corp. differed
from the typical adverse representation fact pattern in a way that
arguably diminished the "direct adversity" between Paul Weiss and its
client. But, the requisite adversity to warrant disqualification was present
and Judge Martin's analysis would seem to be equally valid in all Canon
5 cases.

49. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345,367 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
50. Nos. 99 Civ. 8780,4004 (JSM), 2000 WL 145747, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8.2000).
51. 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979), vacatedonother grounds,449 U.S. 1106 (1931)).
52. See i at *4 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979 . vacated
on othergrounds,449 U.S. 1106 (1981)).
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Sumitomo Corp. involved two separate but virtually identical
actions brought by the Sumitomo Corporation ("Sumitomo") arising
from Sumitomo's $2.2 billion loss from copper-trading transactions."
After sustaining these enormous losses, Sumitomo retained Paul Weiss
to conduct an investigation into the copper-trading transactions and to
represent Sumitomo in all proceedings or litigation arising from them.,
As a result of its investigation, Paul Weiss discovered that certain of its
clients in unrelated matters, including Chase Manhattan Bank ("Chase"),
which it represented in the litigation, were among Sumitomo's potential
targets. 5 Paul Weiss advised Sumitomo that it could not evaluate, much
less assert, potential claims against those current clients, including
Chase, and suggested Sumitomo obtain other counsel for those actions. 6
At Sumitomo's request, Paul Weiss sought a waiver from Chase that
would permit Paul Weiss at least to evaluate Sumitomo's potential
claims against Chase. 7 This request was refused,58 and thereafter
Sumitomo retained the law firm Kronish, Lieb, Weiner & Helman
("Kronish Lieb") to represent it against Chase.59 Sumitomo, represented
by Kronish Lieb, sued Chase, and shortly thereafter, represented by Paul
Weiss, sued J.P. Morgan.60
Chase moved to consolidate the two cases.6 Although the
similarities of the alleged cases were hotly debated, with Chase arguing
that they were "extremely similar" and J.P. Morgan emphasizing the
differences, it was not disputed that certain factual issues were
identical. 62 Suffice it to say, the court found sufficient overlap to warrant
consolidation. Chase argued that upon consolidation, Paul Weiss should
be disqualified because it would be representing one current client who
was suing another current client in a consolidated action.63 Even without
53. See id. at * 1.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at *2.
58. As a practical matter, Paul Weiss' willingness even to request the consent from Chase
suggests the relationship was a relatively limited one. Most law firms would be unwilling to risk
antagonizing a large corporate client that utilizes a broad range of services.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at *2 n.2.
63. Along with the motion to disqualify Paul Weiss, Chase also moved to consolidate the two
actions for pretrial purposes pursuant to Rules 24(a) and 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court interpreted this as a motion to consolidate these cases for pretrial purposes.
Rule 42(a) empowers a trial judge to consolidate actions for trial when there are common questions
of law or fact to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
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consolidation, Chase argued, disqualification was mandated because
Paul Weiss' representation of Sumitomo would adversely affect Chase.
Judge Martin declined to apply Canon 5 mechanically:
No decision, however, has found that the Code's prohibition against
simultaneous representation extends to the situation before the Court.
Here, Paul Weiss is not representing Sumitomo against Chase in this
litigation in violation of DR 5-105. Instead, Paul Weiss is representing
Sumitomo against Morgan, a non-client, while Kronish Lieb is
representing Sumitomo against Chase, Paul Weiss' current client in an
unrelated matter. Thus, the per se rule against simultaneous
representation articulated in Cinema 5 and other decisions does not
require the Court to disqualify Paul Weiss. s
The court analyzed the nature and extent of Paul Weiss'
representation of both Chase and Sumitomo. Significantly, Judge Martin
recognized that he was "not dealing with an individual client who [had]
placed his trust in an individual lawyer for a substantial period of
time." He emphasized that Chase is "a huge financial institution" and
Paul Weiss was only one of many law firms that represent Chase."
Judge Martin also considered the amount of business in relation to the
size of the client (Chase) and the law firm (Paul Weiss), which he found
not substantial in relation to their respective sizes. "
Based on this analysis, the court found no reason to suspect that
Paul Weiss would fail to represent Sumitomo, the nonmoving party
client, vigorously as a result of a desire to please the moving party client,
Chase.69 Judge Martin added that the fact that Chase made the motion to
disqualify, demonstrated that Chase did not believe that Paul Weiss
would not vigorously represent Sumitomo. 9
Most significantly, Judge Martin did not foresee any danger from
Paul Weiss' participation in the case that would adversely impact its
representation of Chase in the other concurrent matter:
There is no danger that Paul Weiss' participation in this case will
adversely impact its representation of Chase in the other matters. The
issues involved in this action are totally unrelated to the issues in the
matters in which Paul Weiss represents Chase. While one can
64. See Sumitomo Corp., 2000 WL 14574, at *4.

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Ila

Il
See id.

69. See Id at *4-5.
70. See id at z4.
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understand that Chase's in-house counsel might be unhappy that a law
firm which represents it in some matters was taking a position in
litigation involving another client that, if adopted, would prejudice an
argument that Chase was advancing in a separate case, that does not
mean that the law firm is violating a confidence of its client or
engaging in unethical conduct.
Because there is no indication that Paul Weiss' conflict between
Sumitomo and Chase will undermine the Court's confidence in the
vigor of Paul Weiss' representation of either Sumitomo in the Morgan
action or Chase in any unrelated matter, there was no reason [to]
disqualify Paul Weiss."

Judge Martin's opinion in Sumitomo Corp. provides an insightful
and analytical approach to the application of Canon 5. If applied to all
cases involving current client conflicts, it would eliminate many of the
difficulties imposed on clients by the mechanical, inflexible approach
that has become de rigeur,and is far more consistent with the purpose of
the conflicts rules. The approach followed by Judge Martin vindicates
the purpose of Canon 5, while also safeguarding a client's extremely
important right of counsel of choice. Judge Martin's approach would
also avoid the mandated disloyalty imposed by the mechanical approach,
the absurd results in cases like Levin and Foster Wheeler, and would go
a long way to prevent abusive disqualification motions filed for tactical
purposes.
III. ENFORCEABLE PROSPECTIVE CONFLICT WAIVERS ARE THE
BEST WAY FOR SOPHISTICATED CLIENTS AND THEIR
LAWYERS TO MANAGE THE PROBLEM OF THE
OVERLY RIGID PER SE RULE

Given the current state of the conflicts law, the best-and many
times the only-method to avoid the deleterious effects of tactical
disqualification motions designed to disrupt an attorney-client
relationship is to permit consenting clients, especially sophisticated
ones, and their lawyers to create their own "default" position through the
enforcement of prospective conflict waivers. In the Article, Mr. Fox
creates the impression that, until recently, prospective conflict waivers
were rarely encountered and infrequently countenanced." In fact, while

71. Id.
at *4-5.
72. See Fox, supra note 1,at 705-07 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 372 (1993) [hereinafter ABA Formal Opinion 372] and five cases to suggest that
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the decisions are by no means uniform, prospective conflict waivers
have been enforced,73 and many scholars have welcomed their use. 4
In 1993, a formal ABA opinion cautiously blessed prospective
conflict waivers.7 " Significantly, the ABA recognized that the growth in
size and sophistication of law firms and their clients necessitated
effective waivers:
The impetus for seeking prospective waivers has grown as the
nature of both law firms and clients has changed. In an era when law
firms operated in just one location, when there were few megaconglomerate clients and when clients typically hired only a single
firm to undertake all of their legal business, the thought of seeking
prospective waivers rarely arose. However, when corporate clients
with multiple operating divisions hire tens if not hundreds of law
firms, the idea that, for example, a corporation in Miami retaining the
Florida office of a national law firm to negotiate a lease should
preclude that firm's New York office from taking an adverse position
in a totally unrelated commercial dispute against another division of
the same corporation strikes some as placing unreasonablelintitations
prospective conflict waivers have been met with uniform hostility). See infra note 73 for a
discussion of the five cases.
73. See, e.g., Fisons Corp. v. Atochem N. Am., Inc., No. 90 Civ. 1OSO (JMC. 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15284, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1990) (stating that the prospective conflicts waiver
should be enforced when adequate disclosure was made to a sophisticated client and noting that the
disclosure does not need to include the exact nature of the future disputes); Interstate Props. v.
Pyramid Co. of Utica, 547 F. Supp. 178, 181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that Canon 5 was not
violated because the attorney received consent and the challenged action would not impair the
attorney's ability to represent his client adequately); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-,'right
Corp., No. 78 Civ. 1295, slip op. at 6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1978) (holding that bcause the client's
officers knew that the company's "aggressiveness and Skadden Arps" specialized practice might
some day lead to a collision," the agreement left the law firm "free to represent any client, past,
present, or future, in any takeover attempt with no risk of disqualification. even though [the clientl
happened to be the unfriendly corporate suitor or otherwise in an adversarial position"); Zador Corp.
v. Kwan, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 754, 762-63 (Ct. App. 1995) (enforcing waiver %%
here client was given
the opportunity to obtain legal counsel and signed waiver agreeing not to seek to disqualify counsel
"notwithstandng any adversity that naky develop" (alteration in original)); Elliot v. McFarland
Unified Sch. Dist., 211 Cal. Rptr. 802, 809 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that "[b]y signing [a] joint
powers agreement" the plaintiff "waived its right to disqualify [the law firm] from repre.enting
other signatories to that agreement"); see also, e.g., New York County Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on
Prof 1Ethics, Formal Op. 724 (1998) [hereinafter New York County 724], arailableat 1993 WL
39561, at *1 (1998); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 390 (1995).
74. See, e.g., CHARLES NV. VOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 7.2A, at 347 (1986): Susan
R. Martyn, Are We Moving in the Right Dimension?Sadducees, Two Kingdoms, Lanv-ers, and the
Revised Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 34 VAL U. L REv. 121, 152-53 (1999); Richard W.
Painter, Advance Waiver of Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 327 (2000). For additional
discussion of Professor Painter's views on prospective waivers, see infra notes 104-06 and
accompanying text.
75. See ABA Formal Opinion 372, supranote 72.
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on the opportunities of both clients and lawyers. While the Model
Rules quite correctly treat such a situation as presenting a conflict, the
conflict is also clearly one that can be waived.76

The Opinion states: "Consistent with the mandate of Model Rule 1.7, a

lawyer may ask for, and a client may give, a waiver of objection to a
possible future representation presenting a conflict of interest that in the
absence of the waiver the lawyer would be disqualified from
undertaking."" To be sure, the Opinion does caution that under the
current law, and under certain circumstances, a prospective conflicts
waiver may not be binding and the attorney may have to secure a second
waiver when an actual controversy arises.7 But these caveats are
unexceptional propositions, and even an ardent proponent of advance
waivers (the Author pleads guilty) would have to admit that they cannot
be invoked mindlessly and that occasions certainly may arisedepending on the specific terms of the waiver, the nature of the conflict,
and the identity of the client-where the waiver might not be enforced.
This, however, is a far cry from suggesting that prospective conflict

waivers are always invalid or that a second waiver would be needed as a
rule, rather than a narrow exception, especially where highly
sophisticated clients are involved. In this respect, Mr. Fox's
interpretation of the ABA Formal Opinion 372 appears to be wishful

thinking. 9
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id.

78. See id. The ABA, in 1993, stated:
[Nlo lawyer can rely with ethical certainty on a prospective waiver of objection to future
adverse representations simply because the client has executed a written document to
that effect. No lawyer should assume that without more, the "coast is clear" for
undertaking any and all future conflicting engagements that come within the general
terms of the waiver document. Even though one might think that the very purpose of a
prospective waiver is to eliminate the need to return to the client to secure a "present"
second waiver when what was once an inchoate matter ripens into an immediate conflict,
there is no doubt that in many cases that is what will be ethically required.
Id.

79. See Fox, supra note 1, at 705-07. In the Article, Mr. Fox asserts that ABA Formal
Opinion 372 almost always requires a second waiver, stating that the "opinion concluded that
almost certainly, a look back will be required at the time the prospective waiver is dusted off, an
essential ethical limitation that is affirmatively eschewed by the [Business Law Section] Proposal."
Id. at 713. In fact, ABA Formal Opinion 372 merely speculates that "there is no doubt that in many
cases that is what will be ethically required." ABA Formal Opinion 372, supra note 72. Of course,
there is a vast difference between "virtual certainty," and "many cases," and the frequency will
depend on the client's ability to understand the "legal implications" and effects of future adverse
representation. This will no doubt depend on the sophistication of the client and the disclosures
made to the client when the waiver is executed. See discussion infra notes 95-105 and
accompanying text.
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Indeed, the ABA Formal Opinion 372 must be read in light of the

more recent Formal Opinion 724 issued by New York County Lawyer's
Association Committee on Professional Ethics ("New York County

724"), discussion of which is conspicuously absent from the Article,"
stating that under the New York Code of Professional Responsibility,

prospective clients may "waive their right to a conflict-free relationship
with their lawyer if they so choose and to consent to their lawyer's
representation of another party or parties with interests adverse or
differing from their own."'" As correctly noted by the New York County

724, "[i]n an advance waiver situation, there is no actual conflict for a
lawyer to examine.""" The lawyer, however, can still discuss with the

prospective client the types of anticipated representations and the lawyer
and client can make a "reasonable analysis of the probabilities of

whether or not this type of representation is likely to give rise to a
conflict that is non-consentable. ' ' n
The collection of cases that Mr. Fox has unearthed also should

provide little, if any, comfort to the prohibitionists. These cases do not
reflect any structural or overarching infirmity to the use of prospective
conflict waivers, but simply involve sui generis cases in which lawyers
failed to explain adequately the significance of these potential conflicts.
Significantly, none of these cases involved situations where the client
was advised by independent counsel in connection with the decision to
consent-a prescription that should be fatal to the prohibitionist position
in virtually every case. If the attorneys in those cases had obtained
written waivers and had demonstrated informed client consent, and the

client had been represented by independent counsel, in all likelihood, the
waivers would have been enforced."
80. Although only two Bar Association opinions provide significant treatment of the subject
matter of the Article, the most recent one, New York County 724, is relegated to a parenthetical
reference in a footnote and seems only to have been referenced to at all because it was cited by a
case on which the Article relies. See Fox, supra note 1, at 708 n.34.
81. New York County 724, supra note 73, at *1 t"[I]n recognition of the very imnprtant right
of a client to retain counsel of his or her choice, and perhaps in recognition of the realities of
modem legal practice, the Code provides that such conflicts can be ,ai%ed v. ith full disclosure and
client consent.").
82. Id. at*2.
83. Id.; see also id. (citing ABA Formal Opinion 372 and stating -[alt the very least, the client
or prospective client should be advised of the types of possible future aderse representations that
the lawyer envisions, as well as the types of clients or matters that may present such conflicL").
84. In Schwartz v. Indus. Valley 7tle Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 96-5677, 1997 WL 330366, at *1
(E.D. Pa. June 5, 1997), the court held that a prospective conflicts wvaiargiven in 1993 in a related
but separate action was not effective to vaive the conflict in connection with an action commznced
in 1996 because the attorney did not inform the client that there could be subsequent ad~ers
litigation. See id. at *6. The court noted in dicta, however, that the waiver would hase Len effectise
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Ethics 2000

In the summer of 1997, the ABA appointed a commission,
popularly known as "Ethics 2000," to comprehensively evaluate the
Model Rules (the "Commission").85 Before embarking on its
comprehensive review of the Model Rules, the Commission sought
comments from an ad hoc committee of the Business Law Section of the
ABA (the "Business Law Committee").86

if the attorney had "'consult[ed] with [his] clients about potential conflicts of interest, and...
disclose[d] the facts and circumstances surrounding the conflicts to such an extent that the clients
appreciate[d] the significance of the conflict.'" Id. (quoting Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1332
v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 909 F. Supp. 287, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1995)). Similarly, the Eastern
District of Louisiana would have enforced the waiver at issue if the client had been truly informed,
as required by the Proposed Rule. See In re Suard Barge Servs., Inc., No. 96-3185, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12364, at *15-16 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 1997) (holding that a valid waiver must "disclose the
nature of the actual or potential conflict" and that no waiver existed because the client "believed at
that time that no conflict existed, so [the lawyer] did not explain the conflict in the requisite detail");
see also Fa. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Carey Can., Inc., 749 F. Supp. 255, 260 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding
that a client's lack of objection did not constitute the requisite "informed consent after consultation"
because the letter was ambiguous and was not addressed to the client's counsel),
The rationale in Florida Insurance GuaranteeAss'n was the basis of Mr. Fox's next case,
Worldspan, L.P. v. Sabre Group Holdings, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359-60 (N.D. Ga. 1998). The
Worldspan court's ruling, however, was based on the fact that the six-year-old "standard
engagement letter" was too ambiguous to satisfy the informed consent requirement. See id. at 135960. In dicta, the court also noted that the evidence did not suggest that the letter was the byproduct
of any consultation with the client-and certainly there was no consultation with the client's inhouse attorney. See id. In fact, there was evidence from the law firm that suggested "that there was
no response thereto.., and the representation was thereupon commenced and continued without
demur" and from the plaintiff-client that they had objected to the retainer letter, Id. The Worldspan
court also commented in dicta that the lawyer-client relationship was one of "trust" and thus, "any
document intended to grant standing consent for the lawyer to litigate against his own client must
identify that possibility, if not in plain language, at least by irresistible inference including reference
to specific parties." Id. at 1360. This rationale, however, does not take into consideration the fact
that before the lawyer is retained, the relationship is essentially contractual, and that under the
proposed rules the lawyer must consider the sophistication of the client and whether or not the client
was represented by independent counsel. Finally, with regard to In re Granite Partners,LP., 219
B.R. 22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998), Mr. Fox acknowledges that the court vitiated the waiver at issue
because it was merely "boilerplate" and that the waiver would probably have been effectuated if it
had comported with the ABA's requirements. See Fox, supranote 1, at 708 n.34.
85. See, e.g., Chief Justice Norman Veasey, Professional Responsibility and the Corporate
Lawyer, Address Before the Kutak Symposium (2000), in 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 331, 332
(2000). For an excellent background on Ethics 2000, see Center for Professional Responsibility,
Ethics 2000 Conunission,at http:llwww.abanet.orglcpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2001).
86. Letter from Larry P. Scriggins, Chair, Ad Hoc Committee on Ethics 2000, to ABA
Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct 1 (Sept. 15, 1999) (on file with the
Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter Sept. 15, 1999 letter].
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1. The Business Law Committee's Proposal
The Business Law Committee specifically addressed prospective

conflict waivers and proposed that if the client were sophisticated and/or
had independent representation, the prospective conflicts waiver should
be binding.f The Business Law Committee's proposal focuses upon the

importance of a client's right to select counsel of choice and proposes
that where a client had independent representation in the waiver
decision, the lawyer and client would be permitted "to enter into a
binding agreement that neither could abrogate under a 'second look,
concept. ''ss

This proposal was designed to eliminate "uncertainty concerning
the validity of prospective [conflict] waivers [that] can prejudice other
clients of the lawyer, depriving them of legal services they expect to
receive and their lawyer expects to be able to render."' This uncertainty

requires a sophisticated client to make two calculations before it decides
whether to retain a law firm that is likely to become conflicted: (i) the

business risk that the conflict will be so harmful as to outweigh the
benefits of retaining the law firm, and (ii) the legal risk that their waiver

of the conflict will be invalidated or challenged in court by another
party, all incurring additional costs for the client. This second

87. See id. at 2 (stating the proposal is designed to "recognize the principle that sophisticated
clients are capable of giving informed general consents to future conflicts" and "that the sante
principle should apply where the client is not necessarily sophisticated in legal natter, but is
independently represented.").
88. kL (emphasis added). According to the Business Law Committee:
A client that has not retained a lawyer for general representation may also agree to a
waiver of future conflicts in other matters that are not substantially related to thove
matters for which the client has retained the lawyer. Whether a client %,hohas given such
a general waiver of future conflicts with respect to unrelated matters %,ill be deemed to
have given informed consent to a waiver of aspecific type of conflict within the maning
of paragraph (b) will depend upon evaluation of such factors as the bItsine~s
sophistication of the client, the client's familiariy!with the nature of the Isyer's
practice, the degree of adversity involved (e.g., whether the waiver obtained referred to
litigation in a case where the lawyer later seeks to represent another client in litigation
with the client giving the waiver), and whether the client was represented by independent
counsel (either the General Counsel, a member of the Law D.partment of the client, or
outside counsel) when the waiver was granted. Ordinarity an adrancewaiver given by a
client who is independently representedby counsel in connection with giving the ivaiver
should be presumedto be an informedconsent.
ld.
at 2-3 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 1-2

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 29:971

calculation is unnecessary and potentially costly to the sophisticated
corporate client.9°
The importance of enforcing a prospective conflicts waiver based
on the circumstances that exist at the time it is agreed on by the client
and lawyer, not based on any "second look" after adversity arises, is
easy to see. In reality, a games-playing client, bent on reeking ethical
havoc on an opponent that happens to also be a client of the same
lawyer, hardly can be expected to agree to any "second look" waiver.
Once an attorney-client relationship has been established by such a
mischievous client, the "conflict" will be used to another client's
disadvantage unless an enforceable conflicts waiver has been obtained.
Thus, the Business Law Committee suggests
once a valid general waiver of future conflicts is obtained from a
client, it may be relied on by the lawyer so long as the lawyer
reasonably believes that [he] will be able to continue to provide
competent and diligent representation to that client in those matters in
which [he] is performing legal services for that client, notwithstanding
the lawyer's representation of another client covered by the conflict
waiver. The client may revoke a waiver of future conflicts, but the
client may not withdraw its consent as to conflicts arisingprior to the
revocation. In addition, the lawyer is entitled to treat the revocation as
a termination of the lawyer-client relationship, with the effect that Rule
1.9 rather than Rule 1.7 would apply to conflicts arising thereafter.9 '
The Business Law Committee's suggestion is a salutary one.
Foreclosing a client from withdrawing its consent once potential
adversity emerges will decrease the tactical use of disqualification
motions and protect the "other client" from being stripped unnecessarily
of their long-time outside counsel during the middle of a critical
representation. Before a lawyer is retained (or retained for a new matter),
the sophisticated client, who is represented by independent counsel, can
negotiate at arm's length with its outside counsel. The lawyer and the
prospective client can discuss the types of conflicts that will likely arise
and the client can make an informed and rational decision whether to
form an attorney-client relationship-and the terms under which the
client may object to the law firm's representation of another client in an
adverse matter. In this context, the client's decision will be based on an
assessment of whether, on balance, the desirability of being represented
90. See Audrey I. Benison, Note, The SophisticatedClient: A Proposalfor the Reconciliation
of Conflicts of Interest Standardsfor Attorneys and Accountants, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETtlIcS 699,
733 (2000).
91. Sept. 15, 1999 letter, supranote 86, at 3 (emphasis added).
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by the particular firm outweighs the inability to object to certain
"conflicts." After the representation has commenced, however, a client
will be motivated primarily, if not exclusively, by strategic concerns
based on the advantages to be gained by trying to strip an adversary of
its trusted counsel.?
To be sure, clients and attorneys can both negotiate with greater
autonomy and fewer constraints before the representation commences
and, thus, the prospective conflicts waiver optimally should be
negotiated before the attorney is retained."' Prior to the formation of an
attorney-client relationship, the attorney can better negotiate and
determine what is in the law firm's best interest and the best way to
protect the relationship on which its other clients rely.4 At this stage, the
client has not invested any time or money in the lawyer and, more
importantly, does not have an antagonistic relationship with any of the
firm's other clients. Accordingly, the lawyer and the client can reach a
mutually agreeable "default" position rationally and on an even playing
field.
2. Ethics 2000's Proposed Rule
Given the sound theoretical underpinnings of the Business Law
Committee's Proposal, the extensive history of tactical use of attenuated
"conflicts" and the cases approving prospective conflict waivers, the
Proposed Rule is hardly as radical as prohibitionists like Mr. Fox
profess. It simply clarifies the previous rule and emphasizes the
sufficiency of the information conveyed to the consenting client over the
timing of the disclosure. In particular, the Proposed Rule states:
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest
under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
92. In Levin, for example, after CBM's representation of Levin had commznced, it was
extremely unlikely that IBM was truly concerned about the adequacy of the firm's represntaltion in
its labor matters; its disqualification motion appears to have been based purely on strategic ground-,
See IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271,275-77,279-80 (3d Cir. 1978).
93. Although the optimal time for negotiating the terms of an advance conflicts waiver is at

the inception of the attorney-client relationship, many of these same considerations may also apply
to requests for a conflicts waiver where a law firm is requested to accept a new unrelated matter for

an existing client. Indeed, many clients routinely use a variety of law'ycrs for different t)T:-e of
matters, and a law firm with an existing satisfactory client relationship is unlikely to forego the

opportunity to expand the relationship by refusing to proceed if the client &eclines to provide the
requested waiver.
94. See e.g., Kling v. Landry, 686 N.E-2d 33, 39 (111.App. Ct. 19971 noting that the

fiduciary duty attaches after the attorney-client relationship is established); C.K. Indus. Corp. v.
C.M. Indus. Corp., 623 N.Y.S.2d 410,411 (App. Div. 1995).
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(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to

provide competent and diligent representation to each affected
client;

(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by

one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the
same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and

(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing. 95

3. Prospective Conflict Waivers
Specifically, the Commission's proposal would simply replace the
words "consents after consultation" throughout the Model Rules with
"gives informed consent" and would require the lawyer to memorialize
the client's consent.' To assist lawyers in determining whether the
informed consent was "reasonably adequate," the Commission's
proposed comments (the "Proposed Comments") provide that a
potentially conflicted lawyer should evaluate the prospective client's
sophistication and, in some circumstances, whether the client was
independently represented at the time the consent was obtained.9
Proposed Comment 18 to the Proposed Rule clarifies "informed
consent":
Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the
relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable
ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that
client .... The information required depends on the nature of the
conflict and the nature of the risks involved. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must
include the implications of the common representation, including

95. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (Proposed Draft 2000), available at Center for
Prof'l Responsibility, Proposed Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: Current Clients.
http://www.abanet.org/cprle2k-rulel7.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2001).
96. See id. cmt. 20; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (Proposed Draft 2000),
reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2001 SELECTED STANDARDS ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 322 (2001); see also Martyn, supra note 74, at 151-52 ("In
addressing conflicts of interest, Ethics 2000 has taken two additional steps. First, we have tried to
make clear that consents to conflicts of interests only validate a representation when they are legally
allowed. In other words, some conflicts so affect the lawyer's judgment and role that courts have
found them non-consentable. Second, we recommend that.., it must be reduced to a writing,").
97. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 5 (Proposed Draft 2000), availableat
Center for Prof'l Responsibility, Proposed Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: Current Clients,
http:llwww.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-rulel7.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2001); see also id. cmt. 10 ("The
lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a
client.").
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possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client
privilege and the advantages and risks involved.
Under the Proposed Rule, the effectiveness of a prospective
conflicts waiver will be determined by examining the extent to which the
attorney is able to inform the client as to the material risks that the
waiver entails. Proposed Comment 22 states: "The more comprehensive
the explanation of the types of future representations that might arise and
the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those
representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the
requisite understanding.""
The degree of disclosure and the extent to which the client must be
informed turns on the client's sophistication and whether or not the
client is represented by independent counsel. Proposed Comment 22
further indicates that "if the client agrees to consent to a particular type
of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent
ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict.'110 If the
consent is "general and open-ended," however, the effectiveness of the
waiver will depend on the client's sophistication."' Open-ended consent,
according to Proposed Comment 22, should be restricted to sophisticated
clients and/or clients that are represented by independent counsel.Ise
The Proposed Rule is in keeping with the previous decision from
the ABA and the New York County Lawyer's Association. In this vein,
New York County 724 noted that
[t]he degree of disclosure that must be made in order for the client's or
prospective client's consent to be "informed" will also depend on other
factors. For example, when the lawyer is seeking an advanced waiver
from a sophisticated client, such as a large corporation with in-house
counsel, the adequacy of disclosure will be put to a less stringent test

98. Id cmt. 18. (citations omitted).
99. Id cmt. 22.

100.

Ld.

101. Id
102. See id ("[I]f the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is

reasonably informed regarding the risk that an unforeseeable conflict may arise. such consent is
more likely to be effective, particularly if the client is independently represented by other counsel in

giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the
representation."). At the August 2001 ABA House of Delegates meeting. Mr. Foy failed to gain
support for his motion to strike the sentence in Comment 22, which allows a lav-er to ask

"'experienced users' of legal services for a prospective waiver of future conflicts of interest." Medel
Rules: ABA Stands Firm on Client Confidentialiy. Rejects 'Screening'for Conflicts ofInterest. 17
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 492,493 (Aug. 15,2001).
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than if the client were a small business, an individual unsophisticated
with respect to legal matters, a child or an incapacitated person.
The progressive changes embodied in the Proposed Rule, which
would contribute even more certainty to the use of prospective conflict
waivers, have also received scholarly support. Professor Richard Painter
has suggested that the client's sophistication and whether the client was
independently represented are the two critical factors in determining the
enforceability of a prospective conflict waiver.0 4 He cogently argues that
courts should uniformly enforce prospective conflict waivers "when the
client is independently represented ... by a lawyer, including in-house
counsel, who is unaffiliated with the lawyer receiving the consent."'"3
According to Professor Painter, the independent representation factor
equalizes any potential asymmetry of information and/or bargaining
power that might otherwise exist between a lawyer and her client and,
therefore, should vitiate any prospective conflicts waiver. '1 No doubt
many clients, especially large corporations, which can have the pick of
the litter when it comes to selecting counsel, can certainly fend for
themselves without an independent lawyer. On the other hand, Professor
Painter is no doubt right that the presence of independent counsel is
certainly sufficient to embrace a prospective conflicts waiver as long as
counsel can provide adequate representation to both clients.
4. The Writing Requirement
The Proposed Rule would also require the attorney to memorialize
her client's consent in writing.'O Proposed Comment 20 indicates that
the writing requirement may consist of "a document executed by the
client or oral consent that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to
the client."'3' If "it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the
time the client gives informed consent," the waiver still will be effective
if the lawyer obtains the writing within a "reasonable time thereafter.""'
103. New York County 724, supra note 73, at *3.
104. See Painter, supra note 74, at 327.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.7 (Proposed Draft 2000), available at
Center for Prof'l Responsibility, Proposed Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: Current Clients,
http:lwww.abanet.orglcprle2k-rulel7.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2001).
108. Id. cmt. 20. The Proposed Comments do not require the writing to take any particular
form but "it should, however, include disclosure of the relevant circumstances and reasonably
foreseeable risks of the conflict of interest, as well as the client's agreement to the representation
despite such risks." Id.
109. Id.
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To be sure, the writing requirement is not intended to "supplant" the
need for lawyers to talk with their clients and "to explain the risks and

advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest,
as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a
reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise

questions and concerns.""0 "Rather, the writing is required in order to
impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being

asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later

occur in the absence of a writing."''

At first blush, this requirement may seem innocuous. After all,
prudence would dictate that there be some written confirmation-even if
it is in the form of a note thanking the client for its consent. A writing
also has the virtue of forcing the lawyer to articulate the nature of the
conflict with a greater degree of specificity." 2 And, if a controversy ever

develops between the lawyer and client over the fact or scope of a
waiver, any lawyer seeking to enforce an oral waiver would have an
uphill battle, to say the least."'

On the other hand, enacting a rule mandating written confirmations
will have mischievous results, especially in practice areas such as
corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions, and banking, where waivers
are customarily implied, such as where a bank lawyer frequently
represents corporate borrowers, while simultaneously representing the
bank in unrelated deals-unless the bank objects."

Despite the

110.

Id.
111. Id.
112. See Martyn, supra note 74,at 155.
113. Mr. Fox states that it is ironic that the Commission proposes that potentially conflicted
attorneys memorialize their client's consent in a writing. See Fox, supra note 1. at 714-15. The.
"iron[y]" is that the Commission proposes taking "a giant step toward enhancing the sfaefuard-"
while at the same time "breach[img]" the client's protections. Id. On the one hand, the attorney is
providing her clients with the additional protection of memorializing their agreements. %,hileon th other, the lawyer is breaching the clients' protection by "extracting]" a prospective conflicts
waiver. Id. at 714. This is not ironic. Asking a sophisticated client to review a pro-ectivo conflicts
waiver in the presence of its in-house counsel would not breach any client protectios t--caus2 the
sophisticated client will be able to appreciate the business risk and its indelp-ndent counsel will
counter any potential asymmetry of bargaining power that could exist betveen the outside couns2el
and her client. Moreover, officers and directors of companies are entrusted regularly %,
ith imp"rtant
business decisions that affect their companies and their employees. The Proposed Rule is consistent
with treating these sophisticated clients with the respect they deserve, while at the sam- time
requiring outside counsel to inform their client fully and to memorialize the agreement.
114. In such a circumstance, the corporate borrower's express written consent would be
extremely important because it might be unaware of the law firm's relationship to the lener. vhich
could be extensive and would affect the zeal of the borrower's lawyer. In contrast, the bank already
would be familiar with all the matters in which it employs the lawyer and is alo aware of the
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unequivocal comment in the Scope preceding the Model Rules,
establishing that they are not intended to create civil liability,"' they will
undoubtedly become a pitfall for the unwary lawyer. In the ensuing
malpractice case on any deal gone bad, where the lawyer's negligence
will be attributed to the conflict, any claim of implied waiver can be
expected to be met with a statute of
frauds defense to any claims that an
6
implied or oral waiver was given."
IV.

MR. Fox's CRITICISM OF THE PROPOSED RULE

The central thesis of Mr. Fox's recent Article is that a highly
sophisticated client, represented by the best counsel resources can
secure, should be precluded from securing outside counsel of its choice,
which is ready, willing and able to serve, if the law firm receives a
prospective conflicts waiver of future unrelated conflicts that may
protect its representation of its other clients if a conflict develops." 7 The
Article considers it "obscenity" for sophisticated and informed clients
and their counsel of choice to establish their own "default position" for
potential conflicts of interests, even when such conflicts will not
adversely affect their representation." 8 This view and the accompanying
condemnation of Ethics 2000 devalues the sacrosanct right of the client
to select its counsel of choice and ignores the unnecessary, and often
draconian, adverse effects on the "other clients," who are deprived of
their chosen counsel.
A.

The Criticism of ProspectiveConflict Waivers Overlooks the
Steep EthicalPrice to the "Other Client"

Stripped of the prolific pejoratives and ad hominem attacks on
anyone and everyone who support prospective conflict waivers, Mr.
Fox's condemnation of prospective conflict waivers evidently masks his
even more extreme view that the duty of loyalty, which precludes every
lawyer in a law firm-no matter how large-from accepting any
lawyer's appearance on the other side for the borrowers and its consent is implied by the lack of
objection.
115. The Model Rules "are not designed to be the basis of civil liability. Furthermore, the
purpose of the rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural
weapons." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 18 (1999).
116. See Harry J. Haynsworth, Business Lawyers Under Fire-PotentialEthlical Sanctions and
Liabilities, in AMERICAN LAW INsTrrUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION (ALI-ABA) (Apr. 2, 1996).

117. See generally Fox, supra note 1.
118. See generally id.
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engagement against a current client-no matter how small and
unrelated-should continue to be applied rigidly and without any

exception-even for client consent." 9 At bottom, the prohibitionist
position expressed by Mr. Fox is that a small group of sanctimonious
lawyers know what is best for clients and, therefore, they should be
empowered to impose a rigid, and some would argue anachronistic,A

regime of undivided loyalty on even the most sophisticated clients to
protect them from themselves and the avaricious lawyers who will prey

on them. In advancing his general condemnation of prospective conflict
waivers, Mr. Fox assiduously ignores the steep ethical price that this
overly expansive duty of loyalty causes to the "other clients" who are

unnecessarily deprived of their counsel of choice and the rampant ethical
gamesmanship that has resulted from it.'2'
No wonder Mr. Fox states
unequivocally that "[o]ther than adding to law firm wealth, one cannot
conjure a single lawyer interest that justifies a device that is clearly
designed to significantly compromise the loyalty interests of the
client."'2
119. In the Article, Mr. Fox asserts that any "negotiated" ethics rules, such as in the conflicts
area, would lead to the negotiation of all ethics rules. See Fox, supra note 1.at 721-28. This
argument overlooks completely the provisions in Model Rule 1.7 and in Model Code DR 5-105
which have always allowed consent to cure conflicts. Because these rules already allow a
"negotiated" ethics rule or "default" without leading to the wholesale "negotiation" of other ethics
rules, there is no reason to believe the Ethics 2000 proposal relating to prospective conflict waivers
would have any such effect.
120. Almost a decade ago, the American Bar Association acknoledged that it w~as reasonable
to believe that undivided loyalty, as applied, placed "unrcasonablelimitations" on bath clients and
lawyers, and that conflicts involving unrelated matters in commercial disputes "clearly" could be
waived. ABA Formal Opinion 372 states, in salient part:
[W]hen corporate clients with multiple operating divisions hire tens if not hundreds of
law firms, the idea that, for example, a corporation in Miami retaining the Florida office
of a national law firm to negotiate a lease should preclude that firm's New York office
from taking an adverse position in a totally unrelated commercial dispute against another
division of the same corporation strikes some as placing unreasonable limitationson the
opportunitiesof both clients and la ers.... [Tihe conflict is also cleary one that can
be vaived."
ABA Formal Opinion 372, supra note 72 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, Mr. Fox seems outraged
merely by the possibility that a large corporate client retaining the Hong Kon.g office of an
international law firm for a discrete matter might encounter a lawyer from the firm's New York
office, who the client never met and the Hong Kong lawyer may never have spoken to, on the other
side of a totally unrelated matter. See Fox, supranote 1, at 730. While heavy on criticism, Mr. Fox
is extremely light on offering any justification, much less need, for any such overly expansive
concept of loyalty. And, because the Article completely ignores the high ethical price that this
causes to existing clients of a law firm who are needlessly deprived of their counsel of choice based
on this overly broad concept of "loyalty," which actually mandates ethical disloyalty, he fails to
offer any justification for the results of the ethical gamesmanship that it encourages.
121. See, e.g., supranotes 38-39 and accompanying text.
122. Fox, supranote 1,at721.
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B. The ProposedRule Will Enhance Client Autonomy
A

sophisticated

client,

especially

one

with

independent

representation, will appreciate the risks associated with potential
conflicts and will be in a position to determine whether retaining the
lawyer with the prospective conflicts waiver is in its own best interest.
And there are many reasons that the client will decide to sign a

prospective conflicts waiver, fully aware that it may result in
encountering that law firm as an adversary.' Of course, the client will
also benefit from prospective conflict waivers signed by other clients,

which will prevent them from stripping it of counsel when it needs the
law firm the most.

In addition, a new client may also want to retain a specific law firm
because the client believes it has the best qualifications for the job.'24
Absent the ability to obtain an enforceable prospective conflicts waiver,
law firms, especially smaller law firms or those concentrating in specific
areas of the law, may be unwilling to accept the new client if the firm
fears that by doing so it could expose the firm's other clients to the loss
of their counsel." While many law firms today are sufficiently

comfortable with the enforceability of prospective conflict waivers, if
prohibitionists, like Mr. Fox, succeed in undermining prospective

conflict waivers either by rolling back progressive proposals like the
Ethics 2000 proposed changes or requiring "second waivers," client
autonomy would suffer. Indeed, most commentators cite "client
autonomy" as the reason to honor2 waivers
and assert that informed
6
consent strengthens client autonomy.
123. See Benison, supra note 90, at 734.
124. See, e.g., Fisons Corp. v. Atochem N. Am., Inc., No. 90 Civ. 1080 (JMC), 1990 U.S. Dist,
LEXIS 15284, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1990) (approving a client's consent to representation by a
lawyer with a conflict because, in the client's judgment "it was far more important that it obtain the
benefit of [the law firm's] familiarity with the ongoing trademark dispute than it was to avoid facing
any adverse consequences due to its attorney's conflict of interest").
125. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 78 Civ. 1295, slip op. at 6
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1978) (holding that because the client's officers knew that the company's
"aggressiveness and [the law finn's] practice might some day lead to a collision," the waiver left the
law firm "free to represent any client, past or future, in any takeover attempt with no risk of
disqualification" and recognizing that the reason the law firm had requested the waiver was because
the "burgeoning law firm, was unwilling to close its doors to future clients by risking
disqualification in its field of specialty merely because Curtiss-Wright might set its sights on some
company which happened then to be a client of [the law firm]").
126. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (TIitRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 202, reporter's
note cmt. g(iv) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) ("The preferred position, taken in the Comment,
is that in most circumstances concem for client autonomy warrants respecting a client's informed
consent."); WOLFRAM, supra note 74, § 7.2.2 ("Giving effect to a client's consent to a conflicting
representation might rest either on the ground of contract freedom or on the related ground of
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C. The Ethics 2000 Proposalis Professional,Not "Unsarory"
Putting aside the high-minded-and some would argue high

handed-rhetoric, that implies proponents of prospective conflict
waivers are unprofessional, or worse-politically incorrect-preferring

base monetary concerns to the exclusion of professionalism,'' it is clear
that the ABA's most recent proposal is a progressive and salutary one. "

Contrary to Mr. Fox's assertion, there is nothing "unsavory" in
establishing a mutually agreeable "default position" as to which future
conflicts will preclude the law firm from acting adversely to the same

client. Does Mr. Fox really believe that all clients consider Texas
lawyers to be "unsavory" because they are permitted to take on matters

directly adverse to new or existing clients so long as they are not
substantially related? There are many clients, especially large
corporations, who are perfectly willing to retain a law firm in a discrete
matter without the slightest apprehension about the firm's desire not to
allow this single "one-off" assignment to prevent the firm from
representing its other long-time clients against it should a conflict
develop. No one-certainly not Mr. Fox-would expect any law firm to

accept such an engagement if it were already representing a client
against the new client without requesting the consent of both the existing

and new client, and it hardly follows that a request for a waiver is any
less appropriate where there is no pending dispute. In this context, the
assertion that a request by the law firm for an advance waiver to oppose
the new client "diminishes" the lawyer is fatuous.
personal autonomy...."); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Reriscd Model of Attinwt .Clinz
Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315. 317 19S71 targuing fur an
informed consent model that heightens the emphasis on client autonomy in the lav,,)er-clint
relationship).
127. In keeping with the sanctimonious, if not intolerant, attitude that questions the c uhtof
anyone daring to advocate the opposite view, the Article contains adhlaminemattack- on tho,.e ho
disagree with Mr. Fox. Thus, rather than simply state that most interpretations of Rule 1.7 preclu!e
engagements directly adverse to a current client, Mr. Fox insinuates that any lavt'er, ith a different
expectation must be unethical, saying he finds it -impossible to imagine that any ethical li,r
would have a legitimate 'expectation' that [the lawyer] would be free to represent one existin.
client
against another." Fox, supra note 1,at 710. In this same vein, he disparages the ethic- of the
members of the business law section: "[w]hatever can be said of the Ad Hoe Committce's
ethics ...."d at 711 n.48.
128. In terming requests for prospective waivers as "unsavory.*' Mr. Fox advances the
disingenuous argument that "the only reason to traverse this uncomfortable terrain is to enh_)nze the
economics of the law firm." Id at 717. In doing so, Mr. Fox ignores his o.%n acknoledgmints in
the preceding paragraph that any client that "has used [a)firm for years" and is forced "to rwma[el
his or her work to another firm would work its own hardship:' Id. at 716-17. These longtian jing!
clients would be protected from exactly this hardship by the prospective conflicts vwaicr Mr. Fox
attacks.
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In keeping with prior ethics opinions, Ethics 2000 emphasizes the
importance of "informed consent," which turns on the sophistication of
the particular client and the ability to exercise free will by
comprehending the nature of the waiver. Those, including Mr. Fox, who
continue to adhere to the "one size fits all" view-which they would
impose on everyone-ignore the realities of the modem world, which
the ABA has already embraced.' 29 While Mr. Fox and the other
prohibitionists no doubt hanker to rename the ABA project Ethics 1900,
it is simply too late to roll back the clock. Ethics 2000 proposals, which
are modest, are by no means "repulsive by reason of crass disregard of
moral or ethical principles."'3 They are a reflection of the needs of
clients and the legal profession as perceived by experts in corporate law
and professional ethics. 3' The intent of Ethics 2000 is to enhance client
autonomy and help ensure that the client's interests remain
"paramount,"'' 2 and the prospective conflicts waiver provisions are a
step in that direction.
D. The Article Bootstraps ClaimedDisadvantagesto Existing Clients
Into Criticism of Prospective Conflict Waiversfor New Clients
In attempting to justify his criticism, Mr. Fox tries to bootstrap the
disadvantages that he sees to existing clients who are confronted with
requests for a prospective conflicts waiver into an argument against the
use of such waiver for new clients. In doing so, we find Mr. Fox in the
anomalous position of professing concern about preexisting clients of
the firm who will be sent packing if they do not sign prospective conflict
waivers with regard to new matters. 3 3 Certainly, the irony of Mr. Fox's
epiphany about the proper level of concern for existing clients who will
be deprived of counsel will not be lost. After all, these are the very same
clients that are regularly victimized in precisely the same way by the
rigid conflicts rules that Mr. Fox advocates so ardently!
In any event, Mr. Fox's concern is hardly necessary. Existing
clients, especially long-standing and loyal ones, who would be impacted

129. See ABA Formal Opinion 372, supra note 72.
130. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 802 (10th ed. 1996) (defining
"obscene").
131. See Veasey, supra note 85, at 332 (Honorable Norman Veasey, the Chair of Ethics 2000,
noting that he brought thirty-four years of corporate law experience and his experience of serving as
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court to Ethics 2000).
132. See id. at 334 (Chief Justice Veasey noting that he "think[s] the client's interests must be
paramount").
133. See Fox, supra note 1, at 718.
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the most if counsel were to decline a new matter, are the least likely to
be turned away if they do not execute a waiver." The law firm's
extensive relationship-and, yes, economic interests-will weigh
heavily against opposing such an important client-even with a
waiver!'35 A fortiori, there is simply no reality to Mr. Fox's professed

concern that law firms will refuse to accept new matters from
longstanding and important clients simply to avoid the remote possibility

that at some indeterminate point in the future another client of the firm
might want it to be directly adverse to the client." On the contrary, there
134. Prohibitionists, such as Mr. Fox, who profess concern that requests for advance waivers
will undermine the client's "trust" of their lawyer, are simply donning sheep's clothing to conceal a
wolfish objective. On its face, this argument can only apply by its terms to an existing attornyclient relationship where a trust relationship has been created. These clients will either have already
been asked to sign a waiver at the inception of the relationship when they were "new" clients before
any such "trust" existed or after they have become unlikely candidates to be asked for a prospctive
waiver if the relationship is as extensive as a reciprocal relationship of "trust" would imply. In
contrast, a prospective new client does not yet have a relationship of trust with the lawyer. As a
result, a new client will not have to "fire" the lawyer if she is offended by the waiver request; she
can simply decline to retain the lawyer--there is no fuss or muss as there is no investment and no
hardship.
An examination of INr. Fox's argument exposes the inconsistencies in his position. Not all
"conflicts" arise neatly at the inception of an engagement. On the contrary, conflicts are often
created or prompted by subsequent events, many of which are unforeseeable, such as the nerger of
an adversary with a client of the firm, see Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264, 265 $D.
Del. 1980), the unexpected emergence of a law firm's current client into a contest for corporate
control, see Avacus Partners, L.P. v. Brian. No. CIV.A.1 1001, 1990 WL 6576. at *I (Del. Ch. Jan.
23, 1990), revid on othergrounds sub norn., In re Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215 IDAe.19901,
or the discovery in the midst of litigation that a claim involves another client of the firm. Absent a
prospective waiver, the newly involved client creating the conflict might be able to force the la.
firm to abandon its other client under circumstances that Mr. Fox acknoledges could cause great
harm, would create the perception of disloyalty, and severely undermine the trust in the law%er %,ho
is forced to abandon the client in midstream. See Fox, supranote 1.at 717-18.
135. An interesting issue concerning the use of prospective conflict waivers is .-,hether once
having obtained one, a lawyer is under any obligation to the existing client to invo.e it if a conflict
arises. Situations could be readily envisioned where the relationship develops with the viaing
client where the law firm would prefer not to represent the existing client against the waiving client.
136. Mr. Fox's ovn cynicism about the way law firms resolve conflicts demolishes his
contentions that existing clients will be "forced" to execute prospective waivers. According to the
Article, given a choice, the law firm's economic interests dictate the outcome of any choice ieteen
clients:
Now the firm is presented with a conflicting representation that the prospective waiver
can overcome. Instead of the firm deciding how to proceed based on considerations of
professional responsibility and loyalty, the firm will now engage in a new analysis:
Which representation offers the bigger bucks? Which client is likely to offer the moast
opportunity to cross-sell and generate more revenue in the future? Which client is likely
to open more doors for the firm?
Fox, supra note 1, at 718. Applying Mr. Fox's own formula to the choice between substantial
current clients and an improbable hypothetical future engagement of unknovm importance leads to
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is an inverse correlation between the significance of the clients existence
and the possibly that this would occur.
E. Ethics 2000 AppropriatelyDistinguishesBetween Sophisticatedand
UnsophisticatedClients
Although the Article purports to address waivers by "consenting
adults," Mr. Fox would treat all clients like children. In his zeal to
impose the same standard-one appropriate for the least experienced
and sophisticated client-on everyone, Mr. Fox rails against the
distinction that the Ethics 2000 proposal makes between sophisticated
and unsophisticated clients:
[T]he Ethics 2000 Commission actually proposes that a prospective
waiver presented to an "experienced" client might be enforceable, not
only as to totally unknown, unidentified, and unanticipated future
conflicts of interest, but even as to a future representation that is
substantially related to a representation the law firm has undertaken for
the client from whom the prospective waiver was extracted!"'
As a threshold matter, it is highly unlikely that a prospective
conflicts waiver ever will be "extracted" or "snatched" from a
sophisticated client.'38 As any reader of the American Lawyer is aware,
the legal profession is a highly competitive one and there is no shortage
of competent lawyers. Any new client faced with a request who is
unwilling to sign a prospective conflicts waiver can simply take their
legal business elsewhere, especially large corporations seeking to retain
a law firm in a single discrete matter. By insisting that the client sign a
prospective conflicts waiver before the firm decides to establish an
attorney-client relationship, the law firm is protecting its roster of
existing clients from the prospect of unnecessarily losing their counsel."'
In the same vein, Mr. Fox's "least sophisticated person" argument,
which would employ the lowest common denominator to render all
the ineluctable conclusion that any significant existing client could refuse to execute a prospective
waiver with complete impunity.
137. Id. at 714 (footnote omitted).
138. In the Article, Mr. Fox envisions a world where law firms "extract" or "snatch" waivers
from even the most powerful corporations. This unrealistic vision is a fictional one, and the prolific
use of these pejorative terms adds no force to Mr. Fox's arguments.
139. Of course, a law firm declining to accept a new client without a waiver is, in all
likelihood, sacrificing the firm's short-term business interests to protect its existing long-term client
relationships. In doing so, not only is the firm abjuring the specific assignment that is declined, but
it is also sacrificing the possibility of developing a broad range of additional future assignments
from the prospective new client. This is especially true where there is no particular reason to believe
that a conflict will develop between the prospective client and any existing client of the firm.
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prospective conflict waivers unenforceable because some clients might
not comprehend all the ramifications of an advance consent, is
insensible. A sophisticated client, especially with the assistance of
independent counsel, if needed, is perfectly capable of allocating a
"conflicts" risk in selecting outside counsel the same way it allocates
business risks in running its business.' The future "conflicts" All not
be totally unknown, and a sophisticated client can readily appreciate the
potential impact of agreeing to forego objections to lawyers from the
same law firm from being directly adverse in any unrelated case.
Certainly, counsel will be able to apprise the consenting client of the
different type of future situations in which the client could encounter the
law firm on "the other side." Under these circumstances, a sophisticated
client will be able to make an informed decision whether to retain the
law firm. As New York County 724 correctly states:
[A] "blanket" waiver offuture conflicts involving adrerseparties may
be izformed and enforceable depending on the client's sophistication,
its familiarity with the law finn's practice, and the reasonable
expectations of the parties at the time consent is obtainel. For

example, a subsequent representation may be said to have been
reasonably contemplated by a sophisticated client, advised by in-house
counsel, who is familiar with a Iav finn's multi-disciplinary practice
and wide variety of clients. In those circumstances, it may be
foreseeable that one or more of such clients may in the future be

adverse to the currentclient in an unrelated nmatter14t

Indeed, any remaining concerns may be ameliorated by obtaining
an agreement that if a conflict does occur, screening devices4"2 will be
utilized. This would provide that different lawyers of the firm would be
used for the "other" client and that no confidence or secrets of the client
would be employed.

140. See WOFPAM, supra note 74, § 7.2.4, at 347 (noting that sophisticated parties %ith
extensive business experience who are used to dealing with la yers are more capable of giving
consent than more vulnerable clients).
141. New York County 724, supranote 73, at *3 (emphasis added).
142. See, e.g., Christopher J. Dunnigan, The Art Formerty Kno:im as the Chinese Wall:
Screening in Law Finns: Why, When, Where, and How, 11 GEO. JL LtGOA. E'ics 291, 29.9-301
(1998) (discussing a variety of successful screening methods); Neil W. Hamilton & lRevin R. Coan.
Are We a Profession or Merely a Business?: The Erosion of the Conflicts Rules Titrh: the
Increased Use of Ethical Walls, 27 HoFSTRA L Rv. 57. 58 n.1 (1998) (definng and drzu.sng
screening methods).
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1. Clairvoyance Is Not Required
While no lawyer or client is completely "clairvoyant" 4 3-except
perhaps those that can claim to be able to predict the horrors that will
ensue if the Proposed Rule is adopted-sophisticated clients can
comprehend the conflicts presented and, with the assistance of both
independent and outside counsel, can foresee the types of conflicts that

may arise.'4 Significantly:
The Code does not require that the facts of each future adverse
representation be known to the parties or described with precision in
order for consent to be "informed." If such were the rule, no advance
waiver would ever be enforceable; by their nature,
such waivers
145
include clients and claims that are not yet known.

Fortunately, it is not the rule, and should not be the rule, no matter
how hard the prohibitionists wish for it. New York County Opinion 724
cogently states: "If the subsequent conflict should have been reasonably
anticipated by the original client based on the disclosures made and the
scope of the consent sought, we see no reason why the lawyer should not
be permitted to rely on such consent under DR 5-105(c).', 416 Even if a
sophisticated client could not foresee every type of conflict that could

arise, they have the business acumen to anticipate rationally the nature of
the potential adversity and to weigh the potential risks against the
benefits of a relationship with the potentially conflicted firm.' 47
At bottom, the lawyer-client relationship is essentially a contractual

one. According to Professor Gillers, "[the conventional image of the
client-lawyer relationship posits two people who have agreed that one
143. Fox, supra note 1, at 716 (noting that because "sophisticated" clients are not
"clairvoyan[t]," it makes no difference if they are sophisticated because "[they] do not know
anything about this prospective waiver except that they are informed that they are not informed").
144. See Benison, supra note 90, at 734 ("It would be aberrational at best for a sophisticated
client to fail to comprehend the conflict presented, either because of its own shortcomings or the
shortcomings of the explanation given to it.").
145. New York County 724, note 73, at *3 (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. See Benison, supra note 90, at 733 (commenting that sophisticated clients are equally able
to assess the risks of accepting the conflicted representation and desirability of continuing under
such circumstances); see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., No. 00-2520, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
19214, at *190 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2001). In Cendant, the Third Circuit noted:
Uncertainties are part of any ex ante negotiation and it should be presumed that the lead
plaintiff and the lead counsel took the possibility of uncertainty into account in
negotiating their agreement. Thus, only unusual and unforeseeable changes, i.e., those
that could not have been adequately taken into account in the negotiations, could justify
a court's decision to find the presumption abrogated.
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will provide a defined service to the other for a fee.""" In this contractual
relationship, the lawyer serves as an agent for her client, and together the

lawyer and client must define the scope of this agency."" When a
sophisticated corporation retains a law firm, the retainer agreement often
will detail the scope of the relationship; i.e., define the specific matters

of which the law firm will represent the client.
As with all contracts in Nev York, a sophisticated client may
negotiate the terms and scope of the agency. Indeed, the New York

Court of Appeals has held that when sophisticated parties negotiate
contractual terms they may agree to allocate risks and in the absence of
"extreme circumstances" the courts should honor this allocation.'f A

sophisticated client should be afforded the opportunity to decide the
scope of its contractual relationship with its lawyer and determine what
risks it wants to allocate, including the risk that its lawyer may represent

a potential adversary in an unrelated matter."'
148.

STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LJ\VYERS: PROBL.,s OF LW AND ETHics 20 15th

ed. 1998); see also C.K. Indus. Corp. v. C.M. Indus. Corp., 623 N.Y.S.2d 410. 411-12 (App. Div.
1995) (noting that an attorney-client relationship arises v,hen a contract is frnned Uatvmeen an
attorney and client for the performance of legal services or the rendition of legal advicej.
149. See GuiERs, supra note 148, at 20; see also Debra A. Saunders & Richard S. Humphrey.
The Thickening BriarPatch of Legal Malpracice.R.ILBJ., Apr. 1998, at 9, 9 (rAsthe attorneyclient relationship is contractual in nature, it may be established by principles of contract and
agency." (footnote omitted)).
150. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int'l. Inc., 643 N.E.2d 504,507 (N.Y. 1994).
In Metropolitan Life Insurance, the Court of Appeals of New York held that "[a) limitation on
liability provision in a contract represents the parties' Agreement on the allocation of the risk of
economic loss in the event that the contemplated transaction is not fully executed, vhich the courts
should honor." Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on Professor Corbin:
Parties sometimes make agreements and expressly provide that they shall not b2
enforceable at all, by any remedy legal or equitable. They may later regret their
assumption of the risks of non-performance in this manner,but the courts let them lie on
the bed they made. where a contract provides that damages for breach shall not be
recoverable beyond a specified sum, it is obvious that the risk of loss beyond that sum is
being assumed by the promisee.
I& (citing 5 CORBIN 0,4 CONTRACTS § 1068, at 386 (1964)): see also Comprehensive Bldg.
Contractors Inc. v. Pollard Excavating, Inc.. 674 N.Y.S.2d 869, 871 (App. Div. 1993) (-[Tlhe
purpose of contract law is to allocate the risks that might affect performance and that prformance
should be excused only in extreme circumstances."' (citation omitted)). Sophisticated parties
engaged in a lawyer-client relationship should be allowed to allocate unknovm risks, i.e.. the
potential adversities that may arise in the future as long as it does not materially affect the lawyer's
responsibility. This is also analogous to the Uniform Commercial Code, vwhich allovs sophisticated
parties to allocate unknown risks as long as the allocation would not violate public policy. See. e.g.,
N.Y. U.C.C. LAW§ 2-719(3) (McKinney 1993); id. § 2-316.
151. To be sure, as with other contracts, it is impossible to conceive the precise contours of
every possible future controversy; a sophisticated client will understand this, too. In short, the
sophisticated client will understand that she is allocating the risk of %hat she d-es not know. By
providing more certainty and decreasing frivolous disqualification motions, prospctive conflict
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F. Sophisticated Clients With Independent Counsel are Neither Inept
Nor Witless and Have Ample BargainingPower
In contending that sophisticated corporate clients need to be
protected from themselves, Mr. Fox asserts ipse dixit that "all
experienced or sophisticated clients are anything but powerful and
knowledgeable."'5 2 According to Mr. Fox, there are "titans of industry
who [are] vulnerable and without bargaining power in their relationship
with counsel."'53 The picture of hapless "corporate titans," who cannot
understand or appreciate the nature of the potential future conflict that
they are being asked to waive or who cannot secure other counsel, bears
no relation to reality. In the real world, clients are by no means shrinking
violets. On the contrary, they are increasingly organized, militant about
client service, and insistent on "fee caps" or fixed fee arrangements. In
reality, general counsels of large corporations today are not tethered to a
single law firm, tend to use many different law firms, and have a highly
competitive legal market from which to select their counsel of choice. It
is precisely because choice among competing law firms is so prevalent
that the term "beauty contest" has been coined to describe the process by
which clients select their counsel from among several possible choices."
At the inception of a new attorney-client relationship, any "corporate
titan" or other "voracious" user of law firms can "just say no" to any
prospective waiver and take its business elsewhere."' Even if "corporate
titans" were as inept or vulnerable as Mr. Fox suggests, and they are not,
almost all sophisticated corporate clients, especially large Fortune 100
companies, have in-house counsel, and any other sophisticated client
waivers will also afford attorneys the ability to focus their time and energy on the "rights" of their
clients, rather than on "satellite litigation prompted by adversaries who are using the conflict rules
for a tactical advantage," because most of these conflict disputes arise between current clients
whose matters are completely unrelated. Moreover, under the Proposed Rule, a lawyer may not
represent two adverse clients if the matters are so similar such that the lawyer does not reasonably
believe that she will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client,
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1) (Proposed Draft 2000), available at
Center for Prof'l Responsibility, Proposed Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: Current Clients,
http:llwww.abanet.orglcprle2k-rulel7.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2001).
152. Fox, supra note 1,at721.
153. Id.
154. See Dominic Bencivenga, In-House Grip Tightens: Strict Criteria Urged for Selecting
Outside Firms, N.Y. L.J.,
July 24, 1997, at 5 ("For years, in-house counsel have winnowed their
outside counsel to save money, improve case administration and communication."); see also Ashby
Jones, Law Firms Join On-Line Beauty Contests, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 6,2001, at 5.
155. See Bencivenga, supra note 154, at 5 (discussing the ways in-house counsel have
enhanced their control over outside legal work and noting that "[a]t no time during an engagement
is the corporation's bargaining position and ability to mold the legal services greater than at the
moment the corporation is about to select outside counsel").
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readily can obtain independent legal advice on the advisability of

executing an advance conflicts waiver, which should be fatal to Mr.
Fox's argument. Recognizing that this appears to completely undermine
his argument, Mr. Fox attempts to salvage his position that lawyers will

be able to exploit their corporate clients by also denigrating the
competence of in-house counsel at even the largest corporations. "[Y]et,

so often, in-house counsel, even in-house counsel for Fortune 100
companies, are unsophisticated, young, and inexperienced."'' On its
face, the suggestion that the legal departments of the Fortune 100

companies are populated exclusively by counsel too inept to advise the
company on the consequences of an advance conflicts waiver is
surreal.'"

In the final analysis, the basic premise of Mr. Fox's argument, that
sophisticated clients are dominated by their lawyers, is way off base.
Contrary to Mr. Fox's argument, sophisticated clients have substantial
bargaining power-often greater than the lawyer-and, aided by
independent counsel, can negotiate the terms of the engagement,
including the terms of the prospective conflicts waiver, at arm's-length.

G. The So-Called "Macroeconomic" Argumlent Exposes the Cracks in
the Foundationof Undivided Loyalty

In the Article, Mr. Fox attempts to justify his criticism of
prospective conflict waivers based on what he calls a "macroeconomic"
argument that he asserts will lead the legal profession straight to Hell. In
the Article, Mr. Fox argues that if more certainty were provided to the

156. Fox, supra note 1, at722.
157. In fact, it appears that corporations are placing greater reliance on in-hous- couwnel and
that this reliance is well-deserved. See, e.g., Jeff Benjamin, View the Billfrom a Proper Perpcctire:
Quality Must be the Focus, N.Y. LW.,July 26. 1993, at SI V"[In-house counsel] are b-etter situated to
identify potential liabilities and engage in preventive counseling. Also. in-housz la%,ers offer their
company expertise, which might otherwise be lacking, in managing outside counsel and ccntrolling
the costs of their services:'); Jeff Benjamin, The Big Catch: What to Do Once You Land It: Tep-Tcn
Tips for Handling the Major Corporate Client, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 19. 1993. at SI rnoting that "inhouse lawyers pride themselves on having the capability to provide all of the legal vork regularly
required by their client at a quality commensurate with the highest standards in the profi4sion"j;
Colin Fergus & Jean Fergus, Proper Izterviewing ProceduresCan Ensure an In-House Match, N.Y.
LJ., Mar. 9, 1992, at S2 (noting that "the role of in-house counsel has expanded greaty in the last
decade. Once considered a mere paper-processing conduit to an outside law finn, todays in-hous.e
counsel is increasingly viewed as a trusted adviser and corporate strategist"); Sue C. Jacobs &
Donna Ferrara, Malpractice Liability Can Strike In-House: l'ariousActivities, Solutions to Weigh,
N.Y. LJ., June 1, 1998, at S4 (noting that "lilt is no longer unusual" for in-house la%%-yers "to close
deals [or] litigate actively" and that "[i]n-house counsel are held to the same duty of care as an
attorney in a law firm"); see also Bencivenga. supra note 154. at 5.
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enforceability of prospective conflict waivers, their use would prove to
be so wildly popular with both clients and lawyers that they will become
so ubiquitous that all lawyers-including Mr. Fox and his prohibitionist
friends-will be "forced" to abandon their high-minded principles and
follow the crowd or perish economically. As the Article puts it:
[I]f some firms start using these prospective waivers wholesale, it will
not be long before those firms find themselves doing much better
financially. As the starting salaries, profits per partner, or revenues per
lawyer of these firms start to soar, the traditional firms, wedded to old
notions of loyalty, will look at these other firms, not so encumbered,
and conclude that the only way for them to compete is also to launch a
campaign of demanding prospective waivers. Thus, with no rules
prohibiting these waivers, the profession will be treated to an
inevitable and ugly race to the bottom as, one by one, these firms
recognize that the only way to remain competitive is to join the
crowd .... ,'
As a threshold matter, in arguing that these horribles will occur
"with no rules prohibiting these waivers," the Article mischaracterizes in
one fell swoop both the current legal status of prospective waivers and
the nature of the Ethics 2000 proposal. At present, prospective conflict
waivers are plainly not prohibited, 5 9and the Ethics 2000 proposal would
not remove any "prohibition" from prospective conflict waivers; it
would enhance their enforceability. There is certainly no reason to
believe that any correlation exists between the enhanced enforceability
of prospective waivers and an increase in their use, and the Article offers
none. More than ample authority already exists to support both their use,
and enforceability, and if a conflict were to develop, a law firm and its
existing clients are far better off at present having a prospective conflicts
waiver even if a question remains about its enforceability under the
specific circumstances."W While some law firms routinely require a
prospective conflicts waiver from new clients, there is absolutely no
empirical evidence to support Mr. Fox's hypothesis that all law firms
have been, or will be, compelled to follow suit. '
158. Fox, supra note 1, at 717.
159. See New York County 724, supra note 73 at *3; ABA Formal Opinion 372, supra
note 72.
160. Most clients are as good as their word, and would be understandably reluctant to welch on
an agreement even if they thought they could invalidate a prospective waiver based on a "policy"
argument, which, notwithstanding the Article's skewed reliance on a few std generis decisions, see
cases cited supra note 84, they probably could not. See cases cited supra note 73.
161. In this same vein, Mr. Fox contends that the parade of horribles that will be opened by the
Ethics 2000 proposal will not stop at the border of prospective clients. See Fox, supra note 1,
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Ironically, deconstruction of this very macroeconomic argument
exposes the Achilles' heel in the prohibitionists' position which is that
even they are forced to recognize that "duty of undivided loyalty"--the
doctrinal foundation that they so stridently protect-is of little real
interest to clients. Indeed, the very idea that prospective conflict waivers
suddenly will become de rigeurdepends on the willingness of clients to
agree to them. If potential new clients, especially large and important
ones, object to executing a prospective conflicts waiver because they
consider undivided loyalty important, they can simply decline to engage
the firm. The loss of this significant legal business by a firm demanding
a prospective conflicts waiver as part of the price of admission will be of
significant benefit to other law firms who do not insist on a prospective
conflicts waiver. Indeed, if undivided loyalty were really as important to
clients as Mr. Fox and his prohibitionist colleagues claim, any law firm
would be far better off not joining the crowd that Mr. Fox envisions, and
competing for all the clients who would be unwilling to relinquish
undivided loyalty by emphasizing their "traditional values." In short, if
Mr. Fox genuinely believed that the duty of loyalty had any significance
to clients, he would consider his own "macroeconomie" argument to be
voodoo economics.
V. THE REAL AGENDA
One need not delve too deeply into the arguments advanced in the
Article to conclude that Mr. Fox is opposed not only to prospective
conflict waivers, but that he really wants to eliminate consent to
conflicts altogether-specific consents to current conflicts as well as
prospective conflicts. In criticizing prospective consents, Mr. Fox argues
that once a waiver is obtained, the decision whether to invoke them at
the time a controversy arises between clients will lend to "unseemly
discussions" centered on which client is better for the firm's economics
and that "[j]ust contemplating these unseemly discussions" leads him to
"a high level of discomfort and unease."'" Putting aside the pejorative
at 723-28. Whether this development would be as bad as Mr. Fox suggests is besid, th2 Plint
because there is no link between conflict waivers which are and always have been explicitiy allowed
and consent to the suspension of these other rules which regulate different t)es of conduct.
According to Mr. Fox, Proposed Comment 22 is akin to Charon and will result in tranorting the
legal profession across the River Styx into the Underworld, see DON'NA ROsENBERG & SORELI.E
BAKER, MYTHOLOGY AND YOU: CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO TODAY'S
WORLD 30-31 (1981), leading to client waivers of limitations on unreasonable attonys' fees,
malpractice liabilities, unauthorized conversations with represented clients, and tha bar against
initiating a sexual relationship with a current client. See Fox, supra note 1,at 723-28.
162. Fox, supranote 1,at718.
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manner in which Mr. Fox portrays such discussions or his discomfiture
at the mere thought that ethical lawyers actually might consider the
business impacts on their law firm, discussions about the relative size
and scope of client relationships to the law firm already occur whenever
a decision is made whether to seek a waiver of a specific actual conflict.
Indeed, it would be as irrational as it would be economically selfabnegatory for a law firm to seek a waiver from its largest client to
appear against its smallest one without at least considering the potential
consequences. It is neither unseemly nor unethical to evaluate the nature
of the law firm's relationship to a client from or for whom a waiver is
sought. On the contrary, the inquiry is ethically mandated into the nature
and scope of the law firm's relationship to the two clients in order to
determine whether the law firm "reasonably believes the representation
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client,"'' 3 or
whether the law firm "can adequately represent the interest[s] of each
[client]." '6 Accordingly, these considerations provide no more reason to
oppose prospective waivers than current consents. Mr. Fox's argument
to the contrary leaves little doubt that he opposes both.

163. MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCTR. 1.7(a)(1) (1999).
164. MODEL CODE OFPROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C) (2001).
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